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Abstract: 
This thesis argues for a rapprochement between Hannah Arendt’s novel theory of totalitarianism 
and psychoanalysis.  Julia Kristeva has recently suggested that Arendt’s conceptualization of 
politics comes close at points to delivering a theory of the political conscious and unconscious. 
However, what has received little to no attention from scholars is that Arendt’s own analysis of 
the subterranean pathologies which she claims to necessitate totalitarianism -- diminishing human 
agency and political freedom; the paradox that as mass culture and capitalist consumption abound, 
we are also less equipped to control human action -- indeed closely remind one of the very 
mechanisms proposed by psychoanalysis.   However, she never discussed this explicitly and 
certainly never cited psychoanalytic tools in her work. By examining the specific moments of 
Arendt’s theory which address the intersection of individual psychic life and the oftentimes 
conflictual world of appearances, we will be able to answer the fundamental question left 
unanswered by Arendt herself: how does one explain the psychic transformation of the subject to 
the extent that he readily desired and even enjoyed his role in the active constitution of the fascist 
project? By reading Arendt’s political thought alongside psychoanalytic writers, such as Freud, 
Lyotard, Lacan, Adorno, and Kristeva, we find that the enjoyment and desire to have oneself 
recognized through action and speech assumed a dramatically different form within totalitarianism. 
Instead of the enjoyment of human freedom in politics, totalitarianism sprang from the fantastical 
enjoyment of human superfluousness and objectification from within the ‘closed-circuit’ 
totalitarian imaginary. 
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4 
Introduction 
At the time of her death in 1975, Hannah Arendt had established for herself a unique place 
in the history of political philosophy.  Her first text, The Origins of Totalitarianism,1 proved to be an 
unprecedented synthesis of political science, philosophy, social theory and psychology concerning 
the elements that eventually crystalized into Nazism and Stalinism. Frequently wavering between 
both political theory and political science, moral psychology and sociology, “Hannah Arendt 
remains a fiercely independent mind whose work defies classification in terms of established 
schools of political thought.”2 The debates surrounding Arendt’s thought show no signs of abating, 
as each year brings new academic literature ranging from her reflections on Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, her contentious views concerning totalitarianism, her criticisms of Marx and even her 
relevance for contemporary immigration and identity politics.  
Her own turbulent personal history with Nazi Germany, statelessness and Jewishness 
became enshrined in her writing, to the extent that many have argued that if one wishes to 
examine Arendt’s political corpus, one would have to understand exactly how she conceived of 
“the great travesty of our time.”3 After her exile from Germany to Paris in 1933 and her 
subsequent immigration to the United States in 1941, Arendt published Origins  in 1951, which 
quickly grounded her as one of the first thinkers of the twentieth century to confront 
totalitarianism from a truly universalistic perspective. As she would later echo in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, totalitarianism is not the manifestation of an absolute evil which had been destined to 
take place in varying European countries (the German Sonderweg, for example).  On the contrary, 
                                               
1 For convenience, I will hereafter refer to this text as Origins.   
2 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham, M.D., Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003): 
p. xxxvii. 
3 For examples of thinkers who argue for the influence of totalitarianism on Arendt’s overall theoretical corpus see: 
Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); “The Survivor” in Toward the Postmodern. Ed. Robert Harvey and Mark S. Roberts (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1993) [Essays composed 1970-1991]; Dana Villa, “Hannah Arendt, 1906-1975,” The Review of 
Politics, Vol. 71, No. 1, Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Winter 2009): pp. 20-36.  
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by the 1960s Hannah Arendt had become a household word synonymous with the ‘banality of 
evil’, the slogan she adopted as her running thesis with respect to totalitarianism: Arendt argued 
that this was a radically new form of domination that had arisen out of a multiplicity of forces, 
reflected through the European-wide decline in the political body of the nation-state, the raising up 
of bourgeois, capitalist imperialism and expansionism, and the infiltration of ‘race-thinking’ 
alongside an already embedded strong anti-Semitism.  
Within the past two decades there has emerged a new reading of Hannah Arendt’s work 
which will become the topic of discussion for the remainder of this paper. Both Jean-François 
Lyotard and Julia Kristeva have suggested the possible link between points in Arendt’s thought 
and psychoanalysis. In his main piece concerning Arendt, “Le Survivant,”4 Lyotard argues that 
Arendt unfortunately subverted one of her most paradigmatic findings, that totalitarian terror 
sprang out of a psychological need which was driven by a latent fear of human birth, action and 
beginning – which are always unpredictable and spontaneous aspects of human existence. Kristeva, 
in her book Hannah Arendt: Life is a Narrative, suggests that Arendt’s understanding of politics and 
the self, which sought “to save the freedom of the ‘who’ at the heart of an optimal political 
plurality, and to not hand it over to some uncontrollable unconscious,”5 rather paradoxically 
reveals the logic behind her ingenious thought: that is to say, “Language, Humanity, all Identity, 
and even Being itself are more than ‘veiled,’ ‘in retreat,’ ‘forgetting,’ or ‘errant.’ […] there is the 
beginning of a caring that is not a relentlessness of will, the last example of the will to power, but 
which preserves nonetheless this miracle of rebirth.”6   For both Lyotard and Kristeva, the scope 
and magnitude of Arendt’s political thought compels us to wager that it would be unjust to dwell 
on what Arendt failed to accomplish, but to examine the forces underlying her work which 
                                               
4 Jean François Lyotard, “The Survivor” in Jean-François Lyotard, Toward the Postmodern (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press, 1993). 
5 Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, trans. Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001): p. 67. 
6 Ibid., p. 88. 
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unconsciously shaped her ‘understanding’7 of politics and totalitarianism. Our burden, therefore, is 
not so much to understand Arendt’s conceptualization of politics and the mind, but rather to 
examine what she was unable to say in her literature.  
It is the principal goal of this thesis to deliver a rapprochement between Hannah Arendt’s 
thought and psychoanalytic theory. I will use her own texts to argue for the implicit linkage 
between her socio-political analysis and a psychoanalytical approach to politics and fascism.  It is 
my thesis that Arendt’s theory comes close at several points to an argument concerning a mass-
psychology or psychoanalytic interpretation of the unconscious motivations which inform both 
totalitarianism and politics. It becomes clear from reading Arendt’s work alongside psychoanalysis 
that her thought is indeed open to psychoanalytic inflection: this thesis will identify the specific 
moments where Arendt (unconsciously) points to the mental pathologies which led to the 
destruction of the individual ego and the decline of the public-space within the nation-state, forces 
which undoubtedly are necessary, underlying components in her theory of totalitarianism. Finally, 
I will extend this study to Arendtian politics by identifying the particular desires and motivations 
which constitute the public space of politics, according to Arendt. Here, it is the case that Arendt’s 
politics is rooted in a fundamental ‘desire for emancipation and recognition from the Other’, 
which indeed is not alien to the teachings of psychoanalysis, but demonstrates a remarkable 
pluralism when examined alongside some of the key mechanisms outlined by Freud and Lacan. 
But in the end, although the brilliance of her intellectual achievement makes us want to 
reappropriate her thought for political psychoanalysis, her overt admission that psychology should 
remain relegated to the private sphere makes this a formidable task. We cannot ignore the 
moments where Arendt chooses to question and ultimately subvert the forceful importance of 
desire, fantasy, imagination and enjoyment in the subject’s open sympathy towards and active 
                                               
7 The single passion driving Arendt’s original analysis of totalitarianism was not to provide a description, but to come to 
an eventual understanding of ‘why’.  As she writes in the preface to Origins: “What I want is to understand.”  
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participation in totalitarian ideology. Arendt argues in Origins that totalitarianism sprang from a 
bourgeois desire for power and capital, alongside a deeply embedded pathos of latent ‘race-
thinking’ and concurrent resentment of European Jewry. I will argue that, while this is a valid 
approach, we must fill the gaps in Arendt’s otherwise complete historical analysis with an intensive 
assessment of the psychoanalytic conditions of the subject under totalitarianism.  Finally, a 
psychoanalytic reading of Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism, the project which I see as 
having exercised the greatest influence over her political oeuvre, will ultimately leave us in a 
fruitful position to extend this study to Arendt’s later conceptualization of politics and the social 
realm. It is here that I will show that the significance of Arendtian political theory stems from a 
fundamental ‘desire’ for the Other, to have oneself recognized in politics. Just as Lacan argued that 
“Man’s desire is the desire of the Other,” psychoanalysis will allow us to flesh out a new, arguably 
more complete, picture of Arendtian politics which can finally take into account the dialectic 
between the individual psyche and the collective. 
In the first section of this thesis, I lay out the subterranean currents within European 
culture and politics which Arendt argues in Origins eventually emerged as the socio-psychic forces 
underpinning the subjective capitulation to totalitarianism. The first section will also provide the 
reader with a historical picture of the academic climate of the 1950s at the time of Arendt’s writing 
of Origins. Here, I will make the point that with the burgeoning role of psychoanalysis as both a 
clinical apparatus as well as a tool employed by philosophers and critical theorists, Arendt must 
have at least been cognizant of the fruitful linkage between both conscious and unconscious 
psychic mechanisms and the external world of appearances. It is at this crucial juncture that I feel 
we must reexamine points in Arendt’s work which closely reflect psychoanalysis’ understanding of 
the internal defense mechanisms that constitute the subject’s ability to deal with the pervasive 
traumas and conflicts within the external world. In other words, in what sense was Lyotard right in 
8 
arguing that Arendt ‘subverted’ her actual psychological discoveries concerning totalitarianism and 
politics, and, if so, in what ways does Arendt implicitly describe a mass-psychology?  
In the second section, I will start the discussion by addressing Arendt’s conceptualization 
of an existential psychology or phenomenology of loneliness and isolation as an essential precondition 
of totalitarianism.  It is the loss of feeling and care for a common world in the decades leading up 
to 1933 that ultimately fueled “the radical loss of self-interest” indicative of the totalitarian subject. 
For those who had felt most frustrated and distant from politics, the objective framework of 
totalitarian ideology effectively replaced any feeling of autonomous egoism and self-reflection. 
Thus, for the masses of people who had typically stayed out of politics, but suddenly felt that both 
social class and political party had become powerless in a failing state apparatus, Arendt argues 
that the unfailing logic of ideology supplied the subject with an imaginary fantasy of a perfect 
reality, which gives him a sense of fulfillment and success after years of failure and a general lack 
of political accomplishment.  
The subjective sense of loneliness, isolation and atomization within the nation-state, I 
argue, emerged during the latter part of the nineteenth century as a result of the subject’s own 
incapacity to mourn the gradual loss of politics. Arendt recognized within European culture the 
steady constriction and retraction of the political sphere, which, for her, was the only space that 
could provide the ‘escape’ from the inequality and oppression within the private and social realms. 
Indeed, the loss of political emancipation and protection and the concomitant feeling of 
recognition within a field of plural persons produced the subject’s disconnection and withdrawal 
from the exterior field of relations with his fellow man. Politics emerged by the twentieth century 
as the game of elite, capitalist domination and bureaucratic control (what was, for Arendt, ‘the rule 
by no one’). As Freud identified in his seminal essay Mourning and Melancholia (1917), the inability to 
overcome the lost love-object – in this case, the ideal of political recognition and emancipation 
9 
from oppression – results in the ego’s withdrawal from the outside world of object relations.  The 
melancholic’s resultant retreat into his own inner psychic world is marked by the disavowal of his 
own ego as he identifies with the lost-object itself.. In the case of melancholia, the former lost-
object rendered as narcissistic fantasy continues to punish the individual ego, rebuking the ego for 
its failure to maintain the relationship with its former love-object. Consequently, any meaningful 
relationship with the outside world registers as superfluous.  
If melancholia persists because of the subject’s inability to overcome or move past the 
‘loss’, the subject will tend towards an ‘escape’ from the brutal assault on the individual ego, in 
which case he may sooth the conscious feelings of loneliness and isolation. For Arendt and 
psychoanalysis, it is in virtue of the subject’s inability to deal with the persistent feeling of loss and 
lack that explains the subjective proclivity towards the objectivity of National Socialism and Communism. 
By repressing the actual lost object, totalitarian ideology as the absolute Law of History or Nature 
satisfies the individual’s overwhelming sense of loss and abandonment, however now with a 
crucial caveat.  The ego remains subordinate to the mandates of the new fantastical object: “Unlike 
in empathetic love, where the ego identifies only partially with its object, in a state of infatuation 
the ego is necessarily impoverished,”8 and the subject consequently acts ‘as if’ the object speaks 
the only Truth of the world. “Conscience has no application to anything that is done for the sake 
of the object; in the blindness of love, remorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime. The whole 
situation can be completely summarized in the formula: The object has been put in the place of the ego 
ideal.”9  The logic of the narcissist is the same self-denial Arendt located within totalitarianism: 
even the Leader “is nothing more nor less than the functionary of the masses he leads,” who 
“depends just as much on the ‘will’ of the masses he embodies as the masses depend on 
                                               
8 Alexander Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn, (New York: Grove Press, 1975): p. 61. 
9 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 3rd Ed. (London: Hogarth Press, 1945): p.75.  
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him.”10  And as the ‘will of the masses’ only exists because of ideology, its object - that is, absolute 
perfection - exists in the following circular form: “without me you are nothing and without you I 
am nothing; utopia depends just as much on you as you depend on the Idea of utopia for your 
existence.” For Arendt, the “unfailing logic of ideology” replaces individual egoism and 
simultaneously orients the subject in his world, giving him a picture of his placement in the 
‘historical struggle of classes or races’.  
But Arendt remains unclear as to why it is that the seeming necessity and deductive rigor of 
ideology should be so desirable.  In other words, even if the masses felt lonely and isolated after a 
loss of a common world, why should they feel that the world can only function in light of a single 
guiding principle? Freud’s articulation of narcissism sheds light on this issue by arguing that the 
retreat into the seemingly perfect, closed circuit of the narcissistic object is necessary because the 
subject is always desirous of lack, of the love and completion once provided through the lost 
object.  After a traumatic loss, the super-ego satisfies this lack by telling the ego, “you are not a 
failure, because now you can have the object in its perfect form, and it is X of the outside world 
which is not part of ‘real perfection.’” The narcissist aligns the world to coincide with the internal 
logic of his own super-ego fantasy. That (X) which does not fit under the totalizing and sadistic 
rubric is recognized as a deficiency and met with a sadistic reprimand.  What is wrong with the 
world, which in reality arises from the subject’s own sense of individual failure and lack, is 
transferred to the external object of difference. 
I then take up the fantasy of X (the Jew) in Arendt’s work and claim that her view is 
problematic because it fails to recognize the subject as fully desirous and, moreover, capable of 
jouissance even in the throes of totalitarian ideology. Important in this analysis is the thought of 
Adorno, who, like Arendt, considers a similar problem within modernity: the elevation of 
                                               
10 Arendt, Origins, p. 325. 
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subjective freedom, on the one hand, and the domination of subjects through the logic of 
commodification inherent in the capitalist economy and the instrumental rationality of the modern 
state, on the other.11 It seems problematic, however, that Arendt, who indeed takes into account 
the mechanisms for the destruction of autonomy and subjectivity in modernity, does not reflect on 
the ways in which totalitarian ideology can lead to a distinct colonization of the world of 
appearances and in turn constitutes the content of desire. Distinctly characteristic of this internal 
domination is the usage of a ‘figure of difference’ as Other, which would behave as a foil against 
the absolutist ideology of Nazism and Fascism. In effect, the Jew represents on a conscious level 
the failure of the nation.  Insofar as both Arendt and Adorno argue that ‘the Jew’ (or in Arendt’s 
language, “the Jew in general”) behaves as the symbol of cultural paralysis, Arendt’s analysis is far 
less compelling after she suggests that the social bondage and stereo-typology of Jews was only 
established through financial alliances.12  By enlisting Freudian vocabulary to analyze anti-semitism 
as a symptom of ‘mass-paranoia’ present within totalitarianism, Adorno provides a justification for 
why Jews were not only outwardly hated for their economic and social position, but indeed were 
deeply ‘envied’ by the capitalist bourgeoisie, who secretly resented their own position as 
permanently subject to the “priority of work” and the objectified values of the nation-state.   
After having addressed the latent melancholia which effectively weakened the political 
subject, as well as the transference of guilt and responsibility to the Jew as a ‘figure of difference’ 
and the employment of totalitarian ideology as the guiding social and ego ideal, I will turn my 
attention in the third section to Arendt’s understanding of the pathologies that produced the 
totalitarian ‘genocidal mentality’. By merely recalling the Jew as an object of transference as well as 
                                               
11 Robert Fine, “Debating Human Rights, Law, and Subjectivity: Arendt, Adorno, and Critical Theory,” in Arendt and 
Adorno: Political and Philosophical Investigations, eds. Lars Rensmann and Samir Gandesha (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2012).  
12 Arendt, Origins, p. 20. Arendt argues that the “handling of private business” based on the loyalty found in private 
affairs, not in politics, was the only kind of relationship “that ever tied a Jewish group to another stratum in society.”  
12 
the symbolic power of totalitarian ideology, we have still not answered one of our principal 
questions: how does the subject take active enjoyment in his active constitution of the fascist 
project? It is here that I attempt to find in Arendt’s thought her possible understanding of the 
jouissance that occurs in  genocide. I propose that Arendt does have a solution to this problem: the 
enjoyment in surplus value and capital eventually led to the enjoyment in surplus people. However, 
this will require a careful reading of Arendt’s account of both imperialism and capitalism, which 
are, for Arendt, essential to the widespread acceptance of a ‘superfluous humanity’.  
The new guiding principle of the nation-state after imperialism was that human beings, 
which at first meant those of the colonial world, were superfluous in the universal expansion of 
unlimited and superfluous power and capital. This ethos was carried back to the nation-state in the 
late nineteenth century in the form of racial, xenophobic ideology.  However, in order to 
understand the level of jouissance within capitalism, imperialism and finally in totalitarianism, we 
must recall that it was Lacan who, referring back to Marx’s capitalist critique, reiterated that the 
‘desire’ for surplus value is functionally analogous to the desire for surplus enjoyment. In order to 
achieve the possible ‘surplus’ value, we are motivated by the hope for surplus enjoyment to give 
up the base use value (We could quench our thirst with water from the sink, but instead opt for the 
‘superfluous’ Coke). “For Fascist ideology,” as Žižek argues in his Marxist-Lacan analysis of 
ideology, “the point is not the instrumental value of the sacrifice, it is the very form of the sacrifice 
itself, the ‘spirit of sacrifice…’” For Arendt, what imperialism, capitalism and totalitarianism all 
have in common is the desire for surplus enjoyment in the form of a command: Give up the 
notion that your action is instrumental and obey the command of ideology for its own sake. Your 
excess enjoyment is what is left over: by subtracting the empirical matter from the form you can 
enjoy only the superfluous, ‘empty’ form (the material brand or the human race or ethnicity).  
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In the final section, I turn my attention to Arendt’s understanding of politics. By 
articulating and rendering explicit the unspoken, unwritten (shall we say unconscious) 
psychoanalytic categories within Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism, we can finally extend this study 
to Arendt’s overall political theory.  Arendt’s politics, largely influenced by her analysis of 
totalitarianism, seems to be fundamentally informed by the subjective desire for emancipation, 
which can only be satisfied by the realization of freedom through action and speech within the 
political sphere. Jürgen Habermas led a critique against Arendt’s work, claiming that her rendition 
of politics failed to comprehend the significance of strategic concerns in the socio-economic realm.  
Habermas argues that the “impenetrable pluralism” of opinions in politics must be informed by 
the administrative processing of social problems, something which Arendt does not account for.  
This criticism, however, misses the significance of specific motives and goals to Arendtian political 
action.  For her, the ascendance to the political realm, and the concomitant partiality with critical 
reason (instead of the instrumental reasoning of the private and social) for happiness and freedom,  
is motivated by the individual’s desire to escape the social oppression of the private realm.  The 
concerns of the political realm, then, will always take into account social oppression - “not, 
however, in pursuit of some ultimate goal of economic justice, but rather because social 
oppression destroys the conditions for political community.”13 The strategic concerns of politics 
can never become ultimate ends, since they must be informed by political concerns and judgment, 
which at the most fundamental level is grounded in the desire for ultimate emancipation and 
freedom.   
This desire for emancipation is informed by the same utopian impulse of psychoanalysis: 
the possibility of a creative and self-developing autonomy but the simultaneous awareness of a 
lack of potential, the subjective lack of communicative freedom.  However, desire is rooted in 
                                               
13 James T. Knauer, “Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt’s Concept of Political Action,” The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp.731. 
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fantasy and imagination, and the cultivation of desire for freedom, and the critique of reason is 
simultaneously the critique of fantasy.  In order to develop this, it is necessary to find in Arendt a 
theory of imagination and a theory of intersubjectivity.  Arendt’s theory of imagination can be 
found in her lectures concerning Kant’s aesthetic philosophy, in which she differs from thinkers 
such as Jürgen Habermas in claiming that political judgment is not due to cognitive factors (i.e. 
valid judgments are so due to the fact that we have preconditions for such), but rather owes itself 
to the free-play of imagination, which “considered in its freedom -- nothing compels us to 
consider it as such -- is not bound to the law of causality, but is productive and spontaneous, not 
merely reproductive of what is already known, but generative of new forms and figures.”14 The 
bridge between Arendt’s theory of imagination and theory of intersubjectivity can be forged by 
identifying the link between her notion of judgment and taste with Freud’s reality principle, but 
with a slight modification. For Freud and Arendt, the ‘mature’ individual15 seeks to obtain pleasure, 
but is no longer “governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle, which also, at 
bottom, seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through taking account of reality, even 
though it is pleasure postponed and diminished.”16  Arendt argues that “taking account of reality” 
means looking towards the ‘realm of approbation’ within the world.  In other words, our pleasure 
now stems from the universal communicability of our judgment.  
                                               
14 Ibid., p. 163 
15 Here one is reminded that both Freud and Arendt are children of the Enlightenment: the term maturity or 
“Mündigkeit” here refers to Kant’s seminal essay, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung” (1784).  For Arendt, 
those who fail to consider the Other in their political judgments have yet to recognize the fact that as radically depend 
creatures, political power is based on action in concert, not the strength of one individual. Moreover, such a man only 
sees himself as animal laborans and homo faber, which only provides him with an essentially instrumental reasoning. 
Arendt goes to great pains to demonstrate that it is only by appealing to the intersubjectivity present within politics 
that man realize human freedom. Freedom, for Arendt, as we will discuss later in this paper, does not exist according 
to a particular instrumental logic, but in virtue of the critical and reflective multiplicity of opinions in politics which 
may bring about unforeseen historical ruptures and transformations.  
16 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York: Norton, 1966): p. 444. (my italics). 
15 
Arendt develops a theory of intersubjectivity in her division between the private and public 
realms; however, I argue that psychoanalysis is in the best position to illuminate this. Arendt’s 
argument that the self exists through its private personality as well as through its public appearance 
within the world is not completely alien to psychoanalysis. Indeed, the Lacanian notion of the 
intersubjective self seems to propose a certain ‘politics’, as the subject is split between immediate 
self-certainty of the imaginary and its representation in language and discourse within the symbolic 
order. Frederick Dolan makes the argument that Lacan “suggests possibilities for articulating the 
essentially plural identities Arendt regards as characteristic of the ‘realm of human affairs’ in ways 
that might well enrich her account of the ‘subjective in-between.’”17  In the final analysis, the 
cultivation of desire for freedom -- the affirmation of human freedom -- is, for Arendt, what 
fundamentally informs the validity of the imaginary and the intersubjective self.  
 
I. The Origins of Totalitarianism 
 
In midst of the turmoil of World War II, Arendt began to work on what would become 
one of the most influential analyses of totalitarianism to date, her tour de force, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1951).  The text was originally published in Great Britain under the title The Burden 
of Our Times, only to be given its modern title after its printing in the United States. For Arendt, 
totalitarianism represented a watershed moment in human history, because it originated through 
the gradual destruction of a common body politic and highlighted modernity’s increasing tendency 
to ostracize political action and critical reasoning in favor of mechanical labor and instrumental 
reasoning. The particular pathologies she located within totalitarianism, to be sure, had much to 
bear on her complete philosophical oeuvre. However, Arendt did not merely attempt to describe 
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the ‘elements’ of totalitarianism, but rather she offered a theoretical alternative for rethinking the 
modern condition after the appearance of totalitarian domination. In her words, modern 
civilization had shattered the project of the Enlightenment or any optimistic hope in progress; the 
new era necessitated new and more chastened ways of examining the politics and socio-
psychological landscape that had brought it about.  For Arendt, we can “no longer afford to take 
that which was good in the past and simply think of it as a bad load which by itself time will bury 
in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of 
our tradition.” 
In her first philosophical masterpiece The Human Condition (1958) and her series of articles 
in Between Past and Future (1961), Arendt furthers her argument towards a theory of totalitarianism 
by identifying the hidden elements within culture, authority, freedom, public life, and the vita activa 
which brought about totalitarianism.18 The formal solutions found within purely economic or 
social theories, such as Franz Neumann’s Marxist analysis of Nazism, became suspicious for 
Arendt, leading her to ask the fundamental question: why was the totalitarian subject, who crossed 
varying classes and interest groups within society, so able and willing to participate in the 
totalitarian project?  As perhaps the most tantamount figure of the twentieth century to lead a 
comprehensive analysis of totalitarianism’s role in distorting the political space, Arendt further 
distinguishes herself from many of her contemporaries by orienting her philosophy around the 
reparation of the political space after its destruction under totalitarianism. 
Arendt’s motivation for writing Origins, as she describes in the 1973 preface, was “to 
understand and to come to terms with”19 the great trauma of the twentieth century.  Her language 
reflects the dialogue between the psychoanalyst, who provides a narrative regarding the patient’s 
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hidden unconscious motivations, and the analysand: Arendt writes, to understand means 
“examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century has placed on us -- neither 
denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight.”20 We must, in other words, come to 
terms with “the appearance of some radical evil, previously unknown to us” by reinterpreting 
crucial historical ruptures. Indeed, the intellectual and emotional impact of Origins in 1951 
“satisfied a number of real, indeed urgent, though often unarticulated and perhaps even 
unconscious, needs.”21 Arendt’s push to forge new theoretical horizons with socio-historical tools 
was, at least in the 1950s, an unforeseen effort to interpret and to explain the twentieth century’s 
greatest catastrophe.    
Arendt finds deeply imbedded within Western culture the rudiments which brought about 
the calamitous destruction of the public sphere, human action and responsibility. It is worth 
noting first that Arendt’s methodological approach falls neither in traditional historiography nor in 
structural philosophy, and most political scientists reject her methodological approach because it 
lacks the substantive empirical-analytical aspects of most any scientific research. She is most 
certainly not concerned with the “representation of the past through the chronological 
arrangement of all the available evidence,” which, “struck her as trivial.”22 Rather, drawing from 
her reading of Walter Benjamin, Arendt’s method of analysis is didactic, which seeks to “present 
events as mere surface phenomena, reflecting deeper, subterranean currents of meaning.”23 For 
Benjamin, “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not 
the exception but the rule.”24  It is the idea or the realization of ‘political failure’ which funnels the 
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concept of progress, to bring about a “real state of emergency.”25  That is to say, progress is the 
result of a critical moment, whereby we are able to move past the failing status quo by allowing a 
revolutionary politics to “brush history against the grain,” to “blast open the continuum” of a 
supposedly homogenous history and to view the present in a radically different light. 26 It is 
Arendt’s goal to explode certain moments in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, which had up until 
then been seen as irrelevant to the rise of totalitarianism. Following Benjamin, Arendt attempts to 
make conscious hidden or forgotten moments within history, in order to “bring about a real state 
of emergency” for the generation following totalitarianism.   
The fundamental questions presented by totalitarianism, for Arendt, are thus concerned 
with a hidden pathos which led to its rise to power. First, Arendt asks, what were the unique tools 
employed by totalitarianism which had made it so easy for the subject to capitulate? Secondly, 
what was the relationship between the polity and the individual both before and during 
totalitarianism? In other words, totalitarianism was rooted in important historical causal chains, 
which produced a particular socio-psychological landscape within Europe. Indeed, she dismisses 
the notion of a Sonderweg or even a distinctly German national essence: “these were not [...] exotic 
or alien phenomena but matters of urgent universal concern.”27 Indeed, her universalist thinking 
sharply contrasts that of Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners. She closely parallels 
                                               
25 Ibid.,  p. 184-5. “The concept of progress must be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. That things are “status quo” 
is the catastrophe. It is not an ever present possibility but what in each case is given [...] Redemption depends on the 
tiny fissure in the continuous catastrophe.” 
26 Ibid.,  p. 396. “Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts but also their zero-hour [Stillstellung]. Where 
thinking suddenly halts in a constellation overflowing with tensions, there it yields a shock to the same, through which 
it crystallizes as a monad. The historical materialist approaches a historical object solely and alone where he encounters 
it as a monad. In this structure he cognizes the sign of a messianic zero-hour [Stillstellung] of events, or put differently, a revolutionary 
chance in the struggle for the suppressed past. He perceives it, in order to explode a specific epoch out of the homogenous course of history; 
thus exploding a specific life out of the epoch, or a specific work out of the life-work. The net gain of this procedure consists of this: 
that the life-work is preserved and sublated in the work, the epoch in the life-work, and the entire course of history in 
the epoch.” 
27 Ascheim, “Post-Holocaust Jewish Mirrorings of Germany: Hannah Arendt and Daniel Goldhagen,” in Ascheim, In 
Times of Crisis: Essays on European Culture, Germans, and Jews, p. 140. 
19 
Christopher Browning’s “ordinary men” in arguing that Nazism’s crimes were not compelled by a 
Sonderspecies but rather “a variety of socio-psychological and ideational pressures and forces”28: 
“The reality is that ‘the Nazis are men like ourselves’; the nightmare is that they have shown, have 
proved beyond doubt what man is capable of.”29 Arendt argues that it was a certain deeply 
entrenched mentality which made it possible for totalitarianism’s insidious form of ‘total 
domination’ to be accepted by the subject as the new status quo.  Totalitarian consciousness allowed 
“for the force of Nature or of History to race freely through mankind, unhindered by any spontaneous 
human action.”30 ‘Total domination’ is, according to Arendt, the ‘production’ of human 
consciousness, by way of formatting thought to cohere to the single ideology; that is to say, 
‘thinking’ becomes entirely impossible outside of this objective landscape.31  
With that said, Arendt attempts in Origins to uncover what, in my terms, is the “socio-
psychological conditioning” necessary for totalitarianism to establish itself.32  Indeed, “social 
factors, unaccounted for in political or economic history” illuminate for Arendt the implicit mental 
landscape necessary for ‘total domination’ to take a foothold in the first place. Anti-Semitism and 
the Age of Imperialism helped to bolster the complete transaction of totalitarianism not merely 
through political means and ends, but more importantly through the belief that ‘belonging’ to the 
nation was not a legal matter, but rather a psychological vice or virtue rooted in the combination of 
‘race-thinking’ and enlightened conceptions of ‘man’. Arendt reflects Tocqueville in arguing that, 
while anti-Semitism had always been present within European culture, it became increasingly 
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‘repressed’ with the dawn of Enlightenment ideals and the prevailing call for equality. The 
tendency to assign all members of society to a set of categories and criteria concerning what it 
meant to be a rational, i.e. ‘normal’, human being granted Jews legal rights of equality.  However, 
outwardly manifested political equality was underscored by the still ever-present feeling that Jews 
represented a particular Other in European culture. Jews consequently never gained a particular 
seat in any social class or strata. But the Age of Imperialism, with its seed of ‘race-thinking’, reified 
this latent animosity towards European Jewry by claiming that state membership was now part of 
a specific national narrative regarding what it meant to be a ‘native.’ Thus the nation came to be 
defined by a particular ‘tribal consciousness’ with the rise of the Pan Movements and state 
ideologies which delineated the ‘secret’ and telos of history.  Ultimately, ‘The Jew’ as Other became 
the ideal candidate onto whom the nation could project its failures and melancholy for several 
reasons: The Jewish state bankers and merchants of the latter half of the 19th century were left 
increasingly powerless through their replacement by capitalist, bourgeois imperialists;  ‘the Jew’ 
was finally reduced to “a psychological quality,” according to Arendt, and “instead of being 
defined by nationality or religion,”33 Jews everywhere were being transformed into an almost 
mythical Other.  
Next, the bourgeois ethic of competitive individualism and competition, Arendt argues, 
brought about a widespread distaste for public activity and responsibility.  A public sphere of 
intersubjective speech and action was slowly meted out through the dominant personality-type of 
the bourgeois, who only looked after the cares of capitalist business and individual labor.  The 
bourgeois value of endless capital accumulation, therefore, was realized as inevitable within 
Nazisim. However, totalitarianism differed from any other government before it due to a crucial 
caveat: the accumulation of capital and power was no longer its end goal, but rather violence and 
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terror became its chief telos: only when the end of government is terror can it be assumed that the 
individual will no longer take recourse to individual thinking and political judgment, which 
themselves are spontaneous and unpredictable in nature, according to Arendt, but will rely on the 
‘seemingly perfect logic’ of totalitarian ideology for existence within the world.  
The final element within the latent substructure of totalitarianism was the disappearance of 
the autonomous individual, the emergence of the mob and the widespread psychological existence 
of loneliness and social isolation. The modern mob is a precursor of the lonely masses of 
totalitarianism because it included all of those who had lost their place in society through 
industrialization and economic and social changes. The overwhelming majority of individuals who 
could not be affirmatively identified with a specific trade or position possessing a voice in the 
public sphere were made ‘superfluous’ members of the nation-state. Because of feeling abandoned 
by politics and relegated to the dark shadows of the private sphere, the lonely mob became the 
chief target for the ideological manipulation of totalitarianism. The difference between the several 
decades before totalitarianism and its actual crystallization was that totalitarianism ensured the 
complete destruction of the intimacy of private life. Arendt sums up:  
While isolation concerns only the political realm of life, loneliness concerns human life as a 
whole. Totalitarian government, like all tyrannies, certainly could not exist without 
destroying the public realm of life, that is, without destroying, by isolating men, their 
political capacities. But totalitarian domination as a form of government is new in that it is 
not content with this isolation and destroys private life as well. It bases itself on loneliness, on 
the experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate 
experiences of men.34 
 
Thus, totalitarian “mass loneliness” means that instead of simply being isolated by one’s political 
situation, the private sphere of individual contemplation, has been destroyed. As a result, desperate 
men who can no longer retreat into their private spaces resolve themselves to the objective laws of 
ideology as a way of belonging to the world.  
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Her chapter entitled ‘Total Domination’ is significant for several reasons. Arendt argues 
that the concentration camps and the Gulag became “the guiding social ideal of totalitarian 
domination in general,” since it was only there that it could be revealed that “anything is possible.” 
In effect, the camps furnished the “theoretical verification” of the totally fabricated universe 
produced through ideology, which never did take recourse to the reality of the world.35  The way 
in which the subject under totalitarianism thinks in terms of “giving or executing orders,” bears witness, 
Arendt argues, to the attempt to turn oneself into an apparatus meeting the requirements of 
ideology, an apparatus which, even in the private setting of contemplation, conforms to the 
objective model presented by totalitarian culture. Everything which is different is exposed to the 
collective and is seized as criminal.  
 
Arendt’s Intellectual Climate: The Generation Following Totalitarianism 
 
In order to contextualize Arendt’s political thinking, we must first examine the burgeoning 
intellectual currents at the time of her writing that admittedly had much to bear on her theoretical 
approaches. With the emergence of Nazism and Stalinism, the intersection of state domination, 
politics and private life became the prevailing motif of intellectual conversations throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  These governments ushered in a new political landscape 
identified by an unforeseen form of ‘total domination’, which clearly differed from other historical 
examples of tyranny and terror. Governments which had been labeled as ‘traditional regimes of 
terror’ include, The Reign of Terror (1793-1794), Shaka’s rule over the Zulu (1816–1828), the rule 
of Ivan IV Vasilyevich (Ivan the Terrible, 1547-1584) in Russia, and the Massacre of the Innocents 
carried out by the Roman King Herod (37-4 BCE). In these cases, terror was characterized by the 
                                               
35 Ibid., p. 438. 
23 
mass executions of supposed enemies of the state; nonetheless, their form of domination directly 
followed the traditional conceptualization of state tyranny outlined by the Greeks:  a leader or 
group which “rules without law, looks to his own advantage rather than that of his own subjects, 
and uses extreme and cruel tactics […] against his own people as well as others.”36  Framing state 
terror as the absolute oppression of the masses carried out by the will of a few, moreover, carried 
well into the twentieth century with few modifications. The French social psychologist Gustave 
LeBon wrote in 1916 during the turmoil of the First World War:  “Terrorization has always been 
employed by revolutionaries no less than by kings, as a means of impressing their enemies, and as 
an example to those who were doubtful about submitting to them [...]"37 However, after 1945 a 
whole cadre of philosophers, political scientists, historians, and social psychologists -- including 
Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann and 
Leo Löwenthal -- were confronted with the question: how could Nazism and Stalinism be 
explained, whose terror was no longer a function of state structure and its apparatuses. In other 
words, ‘total domination’ did not depend on ‘a leader or group’ to oppress the masses. Quite the 
contrary. Totalitarianism had enlisted an all-too-willing subject as an active participant in state 
terror, whose submission had not entirely resulted from the Leader’s or the Party’s tyrannical 
control, but rather had grown out of an internalized self-subordination created through totalizing 
ideology. As Arendt herself astutely remarks in Origins, the key difference between totalitarian 
terror and all other historical examples of terror is that totalitarianism does not stop after the 
liquidation of political opposition. Totalitarianism aims to replace any spontaneous human action 
with the single movement of history established by ideology:  
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In a perfect totalitarian government, where all men have become ‘One Man’, where all action aims 
at the acceleration of the movement of nature or history, where every single act is the execution of 
a death sentence which Nature or History has already pronounced, that is, under conditions where 
terror can be completely relied upon to keep the movement in constant motion, no principle of 
action separate from its essence would be needed at all.38 
 
The new canon of thinkers that arose in the aftermath of Nazism and Stalinism centered 
their focus on the diminishing body politic and public sphere as evidenced by these particular 
governments. Still, others sought to understand the capitulation to and endorsement of fascist 
ideology in terms of the loss of subjective autonomy and capacity for critical reflection. However, 
central to this new generation of thinkers became the theories of psychoanalysis originally 
proposed by Freud prior to the outbreak of totalitarianism in Europe. Suddenly, psychoanalysis 
became important to the study of social and political life, as its central tenets were employed by 
The Frankfurt School in the 1950s and 1960s. Psychoanalysis revolutionized the way in which 
political and social theorists approached the intersection of state domination and individual life: 
specifically, the significance of ideological state apparatuses in determining individual 
consciousness as well as the psychic mechanisms for constituting the political and social imaginary. 
The role of the unconscious mind, its structures and mechanisms – displacement, disavowal, 
repression; masochism and narcissism; projection, identification, and delusion – became central to 
cultural analysis, Marxist theory, feminism, political thought, as well as literary criticism. It became 
apparent for many that psychoanalytic theory could be used effectively in studying both the 
genesis and the persistence of subjective endorsement of fascist ideology. Hugh Trevor Roper, a 
historian of Nazism, recognized the use of psychology in political philosophy and science: 
The study of history and politics is primarily the study of men, and [...] all political theory 
and political science must begin with a clear view of the psychology of man, at least in 
certain aspects of his behavior. All the great and effective political theorists have 
recognized this.  Hobbes began his political theory with a psychological theory -- his 
mechanical, despotic state was devised for a mechanical, fear-driven humanity. John Locke 
and his eighteenth century followers advocated freedom --- i.e., non-intervention by 
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government -- on the assumption that man was naturally good and self-improving and that 
his economic activities were naturally helpful to society [...] The same point can be made 
indefinitely. Political theory that does not start from a theory of man is in my view quite 
worthless.39 
 
Social and political theorists began to take seriously their oftentimes implicit psychological 
hypotheses concerning authority, internal censure and domination, the link between external 
oppression and internal repression, and the paralysis of judgment and the triumph of instrumental 
over critical reason. 
Hannah Arendt is well known for her lack of sympathy for psychoanalysis and individual 
psychology.  She was quick to condemn “psychology, depth psychology or psychoanalysis, which 
discovers no more than the ever-changing moods, the ups and downs of our psychic life” and 
whose “results and discoveries are neither particularly appealing nor very meaningful in 
themselves.”40 Indeed, for Arendt, “the monotonous sameness and pervasive ugliness so highly 
characteristic of the findings of modern psychology” seems to contrast “so obviously” with the 
“enormous variety and richness” of the individual’s outward display to the world.41  Julia Kristeva 
has argued that Arendt’s preference to ignore psychoanalysis and psychology are: 
[...] not only for reasons that she would no doubt deem ‘personal’ but also as part of an 
effort to sustain the consistency in her thought.  Her main goal is to preserve the freedom 
of the ‘who’ at the heart of an optimal political plurality and to avoid subjecting it to an 
unchecked unconscious. In doing so, she runs the risk of depriving the ‘who of someone’ 
of its body, making it cumbersome, perhaps, but also incredibly flexible.42  
 
For Kristeva, then, Arendt’s rejection of the unconscious came out of an effort to preserve the 
uniqueness of each individual subject.  However, what Arendt does not realize in doing so, is that 
the implication is, we should remain quiet concerning the way in which the internally constituted 
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Self has developed psychohistorically – something which must have an impact on one’s 
appearance in the world.  
Arendt was clearly aware of the prevailing psychoanalytic circles and intellectual currents at 
the time she wrote Origins and The Human Condition, and most certainly by 1978 when she 
published The Life of the Mind. Psychoanalytic theory was well received by the late 1950s and 1960s 
in a milieu of academic powerhouses, including The Frankfurt School.  Melanie Klein (1882-1960) 
alongside Anna Freud (1895-1982) became the guiding female psychoanalytic theorists of the first 
half of the twentieth century, who, like Arendt, had lived and worked first in German-speaking 
countries, but with the rise of Nazism had migrated to England and the USA.  Instrumental in 
broadening the scope of psychoanalysis past the seminal theories of Anna’s father, Sigmund Freud, 
their work expanded the field “to include narcissistic personality disorders, character analysis, ego 
psychology, and the treatment of depressive and schizoid as well as neurotic conditions in children 
and adults,” drawing attention to the “interpersonal and maternal determinants of our psychology 
so scandalously overlooked by Freud.”43 Carl Jung (1875-1961) in his essay Wotan expanded his 
theory of the collective unconscious to the study of Nazism, which “drew on Environmental 
Determinism and Völkisch roots. The theory of the collective unconscious would allow for the 
possibility of a racial and a national unconscious which have obvious political implications.”44  In 
1944 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno published The Dialectic of Enlightenment, which enlisted 
psychoanalytic tools to discuss the various pathologies which shaped the failure of the Age of 
Enlightenment and which had led to the eventual leveling of the three-pronged nature of 
civilization: politics, economics and culture. In all three cases, the plains of autonomy are 
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compressed and flattened into a two dimensional self, whereby all parts of life have become 
dominated by the ‘culture machine,’ the apparatus created through capitalism’s tendency to 
commodity and homogenate all aspects of living.  This flattening, according to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, is also characterized by the subjective loss of autonomy within the archetypes, clichés, 
images and paradigms of the culture machine.  Finally, the Freudian psychoanalysis Jacques Lacan 
(1901-1981) became a powerful voice in the French school of psychoanalysis throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. Thinkers such as Slavoj Žižek and Deleuze and Guatarri were able to absorb 
Lacan’s three orders – the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic – into their philosophical and 
critical analyses in order to show the intrapsychic forces governing the ego’s understanding of 
subjectivity, politics and culture.  
  Perhaps Arendt’s division between the private and the public realms, a prevailing 
leitmotif which runs throughout her life’s work, may indeed shed light on the issue as to why she 
never conducted an intensive study of psychoanalysis. To be sure, psychoanalysis is a tool with 
which one can analyze and reveal the hidden neuroses of one’s private life, by way of sexual 
experience, trauma and repression.  However, for Arendt the collision of the private and public 
realms not only crippled the public realm’s capacity for human action and freedom, but it 
eliminated the private realm’s ability for refuge, self-reflection, and re-birth. In other words, 
Arendt’s writing suggests that psychoanalysis would have interfaced the political realm with the 
varying private realm activities of man, all of which Arendt believed promulgated totalitarian 
results. 
For Arendt, it became impossible to grasp the usefulness of psychoanalytic theory as an 
instrument for the analysis of political transformations or decisive historical ruptures, because any 
tendency to individualize the public realm, whereby the convictions of private life were routinely 
applied to the public realm, was suspiciously in step with bourgeois mentality.  In The Origins of 
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Totalitarianism (hereafter: Origins) we find that it was the decline of the public sphere of the nation-
state which helped usher in totalitarianism, accomplished through the rise of a manipulative 
bourgeoisie who utilized the state as a tool for its own economic and ideological domination, 
rooted in the imperialism and racism of the nineteenth century.  The imperialist-minded bourgeois 
proffered the idea that citizenship was no longer linked to constitutional law or tradition, but 
rather tied up in conceptions of race and isolationism (crystallized by the decline of the party 
system in favor of the Pan-movement race ideologies). Finally, after the Great Depression, 
revolution, and the aftermath of the First World War, the failure of the nation-state produced a 
feeling of isolation and separation, whereby men no longer felt bound by the responsibilities of 
public life, and were increasingly indifferent and apathetic to politics.  The “mass man,” who no 
longer believed in public interest and support, was now deeply invested in the primacy of private 
interest and individual labor.  Totalitarian ideology, according to Arendt, was openly endorsed 
because it supplied concrete answers and futures to men who felt isolated from a public and 
political world of plurality.  
The prevailing bourgeois mentality of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was, for 
Arendt, at the heart of the decline of the public sphere: that is to say, the bourgeois promulgated a 
long-held apathy to public responsibility due to its belief that individual success or failure is 
singularly tied to ruthless competition: “a citizen’s duties and responsibilities could only be felt to 
be a needless drain on his limited time and energy.”45  Otto Rank, a close colleague of Sigmund 
Freud, argued that it was indeed this ‘self-sufficient type,’ the autonomous ego, of the bourgeois 
personality which psychoanalysis itself had originally sought to normalize. After all, it was the 
rational individualism cherished by the Enlightenment and accepted by bourgeois culture which 
led to theories of a ‘normal’ self, allowing for any deviations to be cast out as ‘neurotic’ or  
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‘abnormal’, “even when it was not an outspoken illness but merely a matter of difference in 
temperament, character or social standards.”46 For Arendt, because psychoanalysis grew with 
Freud – out of the “leveling of all human psychology to the common denominator of a neurotic 
world view, according to which almost every manifestation of human thought and behavior has 
been labeled ‘pathological’ or ‘abnormal,’ except the psychology itself which is accepted as an 
unfailing standard” – it harbored the same tendency to ignore human plurality and difference. 
Arendt must have argued that psychoanalysis as practiced by Freud could not allow for real 
personality development in terms of autonomy and creativity, because it was based on a 
deterministic point of view, a theory of the self that disguised the prevailing ideology of the day -- 
that of the bourgeois personality.   
However, the notion that psychoanalysis is characterized by a “monotonous sameness and 
pervasive ugliness”47 is just wrong. Neither Freud nor for that matter any psychologist or 
psychoanalyst are cited in The Life of the Mind, which at first glance would seem an ideal starting 
point. Instead, she elects to borrow from one of Nietzsche’s more psychologically loaded passages 
in order to demonstrate that the field only unveils the ugliness, repetition and abnormality of the 
psyche: “Das Gefühl ist herrlich, wenn es im Grunde bleibt; nicht aber wenn es an den Tag tritt, sich zum Wesen 
machen und herrschen will.”48 But as Kristeva argues, why should we be afraid of the “ugliness” of our 
inner world, which so clearly does compel our actions and thinking?  
Even more important, it is simply not true, except perhaps in the case of a psychoanalytic 
vulgate not worthy of Arendt’s seriousness of purpose, that psychoanalysis remains at the 
level of the ‘general’ at the cost of ‘discourse.’ Quite the contrary, Freud’s discovery has 
shown that psychic life becomes a life only when it represents itself in a unique way – in 
the particular discourse that constitutes a veritable poetics and maieutics of the individual 
subject. Psychoanalysis invokes a representation that endures until it reaches the ‘ugliness’ 
of the urge [...].49 
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Freud talks about psychoanalysis as a scientific theory which has uncovered timeless truths; 
however, recent developments in psychoanalytic theory and criticism have shown that concrete 
historical realities do not have to be generalized and dehistoricized. Psychoanalytic theory 
furnishes a set of analytical categories and dynamics that can be historicized and mobilized to 
account for the cathexis of the subject to totalitarian power.  
The central question which runs throughout this thesis is: In what ways can the thought of 
Hannah Arendt be open to psychoanalytic inflection, allowing one to see that Arendt actually 
approached, ablbeit not explicitly, but unwittingly, that there was a “psychic” basis of fascism and 
“total domination”? Relatedly, if it is the case that there is reason to argue that Arendt herself 
unconsciously arrived at close parallels between her own work and psychoanalytic theory itself, in 
what ways does she subvert this claim and consciously ignore potentially insightful discoveries 
involving the interrelation between the Self and politics and totalitarian domination? It is clear that 
Arendt understood the way in which totalitarian ideology acts as an objective apparatus which 
sought to diminish and ultimately eradicate critical reflection. She suggests that the terror of 
totalitarianism is only possible because its “onion like shape” and “cold logic of ideology” were 
able to mask the subject from his underlying sense of loneliness and isolation from the reality of 
the world. Indeed, making the difference between totalitarianism and other historical forms of 
oppression and domination, Arendt argued in Origins that this form of government based on terror 
and violence against its citizenry was never content with dominating the subject by “external 
means, namely, through the state and a machinery of violence,” but rather through the ideological 
apparatus employed by the state and culture, “totalitarianism has discovered a means of 
dominating and terrorizing human beings from within.”50 Moreover, she also understood, that, just 
as the artificially fabricated totalitarian universe, which subsumes all elements of reality according 
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to the dictates of ideology, seems in the eye of the totalitarian subject to be the ‘perfect reality’ of 
the world, it actually represents “an anti-social situation and harbor[s] a principle destructive for all 
human living-together.”51 She outlines the subterranean socio-psychic forces inherent within 
totalitarianism which crystallized in the leveling of personal autonomy and critical reflection: the 
subject is propelled into a world of loneliness, isolation and objectivity, a place from which rational 
judgment and conscience are precluded, and where being within the world only makes sense 
within the single, closed-circuit totalitarian ideology. The starting point for totalitarian ideology, 
for Arendt, is the supposed “race or class,” whereby “Nazi Germany and Marxist Russia sought to 
imperialize the world through the extension of these ideas over all time and space.”52 Moreover, 
the ‘object of difference’ necessary for this original premise is ‘the Jew’ or particular class 
In the end, it is clear that Arendt moved past the traditional, rationalist philosophical 
accounts of human intentionality, “which were not rich enough to account fully for irrational 
actions,” and opted to explain how “present circumstances or prior conditioning might explain 
what appears to be irrational behavior.”53 Indeed, I argue that Arendt’s own writing on 
totalitarianism shows remarkable parallels to the philosopher of mind Brian Faye: “To explain an 
intentional act is to pick out the practical reasoning process which caused it,” argues Faye, “and 
this process can be illogical and still play its explanatory role. Contrary to rationalism, a 
commitment to explaining intentional acts by giving the reasons for them does not require that we 
believe that all actions are rational at some level. Intentional activity is not restricted to the domain 
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of the rational.”54 It seems, then, that Arendt’s concern with psychoanalysis and Freud’s 
“unconscious” was less that it posed a threat to human reason, but rather our study of history and 
understanding of human action. Above all, Arendt sought to avoid any interpretative process which 
‘subsumed’ the entirety of human events under a single category. Moreover, recall from our 
discussion above that Arendt did not claim that the interpretation of history followed a “rational 
interpretive process that attributes different meanings to established facts, depending on the 
context or framework within which a scholar works.”55 Rather, as Seyla Benhabib and Julia 
Kristeva has argued, Arendt’s conception of history follows both Benjamin’s notion of 
fragmentary history as well as the “phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger and according to 
which memory is the mimetic recollection of the lost origins of phenomena as contained in some 
fundamental human experience.”56 Thus viewed as a ‘common narrative,’ life, action and thought 
can only be seen as distinctly human if they are revealed as a ‘memory’ by virtue of a common 
relation among successive manifestations: narration of history in politics concerns itself with 
exploding moments in the past in order to grant new meaning to our understanding of the present, 
constructing an ongoing narrative, irreducible to one set of interpretation. 
However, Freud himself employed exactly this method in his analyses of individual ego-
history. “Freud used the term Nachträglichkeit (“deferred action”) to indicate the way in which 
events acquired significance through revision, ‘rearrangement in accordance with fresh 
circumstances . . . a re-transcription.’”57 Analysis seeks to uncover those repressed moments in the 
analysand’s history, and to bring him to recognition of the forgotten forces which have shaped his 
own subjectivity. For her part, Arendt wagered that through ‘narrative history’ (which she 
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employed as a tool for professional historiography as well as political memory) we could gradually 
reveal the moments of ‘repressed’ history – namely those elements of imperialism and anti-
Semitism in Europe’s pre-totalitarian era – which have been forgotten and left untold in our 
common narratives. Similarly, “Freudian theory is skeptical of the evolutionary chronology that 
shapes professional historians’ presentations, instead attending to the role repression or nostalgia 
play in the construction of memory, and to the interruptions and discontinuities that characterize 
the necessarily uneven and often chaotic interactions of past and present in the psyche.”58 In the 
following analysis, therefore, I will show how Freud’s move from individual to collective 
psychology is reflected in Arendt’s analysis of the relationship between private actor and the body 
politic: in both cases, the recollection of the lost or repressed origins of trauma and action, which 
unconsciously shape our discourse in the present, can only be represented through an ongoing 
narrative with the Other.  
Along these lines, one is reminded of Arendt’s attempt to return the “lost” public space, 
the distinction between private and public – in short, to reveal the forgotten historical moments  
which brought about its decline. However, this is not to imply that there ever was an “original” 
political situation, but rather, when tradition is lost, it is only the public space which can restore 
the “unending discourse among men,” which demonstrates that “there cannot be one single truth 
within the human world.” When Arendt reflects on The Parable of the Three Rings, she argues 
that exactly because it is impossible to discern an original, model ring (Musterring), it is clear that 
any interpretation of its power is valid: the very act of interpretation is done out of the realization 
that  had the “genuine” ring actually existed “that would mean an end to discourse and thus to 
friendship and thus to humanness.”59 This perpetual return to political interpretation after the loss 
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of the original reminds one of Freud’s reading of the unconscious as “a movement of translation 
without an original, as a process of representation without a ‘represented.’”60  
  Placing Arendt alongside psychoanalysis in this way will provide us grounds to identify 
the aspects of totalitarianism and politics which she may have acknowledged herself, had she 
discovered her own affinities with psychohistory. It is clear that Arendt (unconsciously) saw many 
of the same structures and elements within totalitarianism for which social-psychology and 
psychoanalysis have argued; however, she does not answer the fundamental question of desire. 
Thus, I will argue that what explains the irrationality behind totalitarianism is its ability to function as an 
apparatus of success and enjoyment: the subject’s unconscious impulses can be transfigured and 
his desires satisfied, but also, on the other hand, as a curtain blinding his reflection past the 
sameness of ideology. Just as I will argue that Arendt’s political theory suggests a ‘subjective desire 
for emancipation and recognition’ which can only be satisfied via one’s entrance into the political 
sphere,61 there is no reason to doubt that the totalitarian subject would equally desire emancipation in some form in 
order to free himself (at least consciously) from his loneliness in private life and isolation from politics. The 
totalitarian subject, therefore, desires totalitarianism along the same lines as the normal political 
subject, however, this time his feeling of freedom is false insofar as it does not belong to him – it is 
always dependent on the subject’s (enjoyable) compulsion to imitate the objective, totalitarian 
ideology.  
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II. Totalitarianism’s Paradox: Mourning the loss of politics and the enjoyment of a 
‘superfluous’ humanity 
The most remarkable characteristic of melancholia, 
and the one in most need of explanation, is its 
tendency to change round into mania – a state which is the 
opposite of it in its symptoms […] All such 
situations are characterized by high spirits, by the 
signs of discharge of joyful emotion and by increased 
readiness for all kinds of action […] we may venture 
to assert that mania is nothing other than a triumph 
of this sort, only that here again what the ego has 
surmounted and what it is triumphing over remain hidden 
from it. 
Sigmund Freud, Mourning and Melancholia [my emphasis, 
J.R.P.]62 
 
 
In his critique of Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism, Jean-François Lyotard has argued that 
Arendt’s account of totalitarianism is “essentially an external one,” primarily falling back on a 
historico-political method. For Lyotard, Arendt subverted her “real discovery” of “the origins of 
totalitarianism” as a psychological force when she located the unique and resistant “onion 
structure” of totalitarian ideology and organization: sheltering the totalitarian world from the 
outside, real reality, “[t]he onion structure enables the system, by its organization, to be resistant to 
the shock with which it is threatened by the factuality of the real world.”63  Lyotard has suggested 
that Arendt missed the fact that, “for such a powerful instrument of foreclosure, of forgetting, as 
totalitarianism to be fabricated, the [Heideggerian] Thing must appear extremely threatening, the 
relation of desire to the real must be one of extreme defenselessness.” In other words, “the reality that needs 
filtering is not brute fact,” but rather “its degree of anxiety, its quality of attraction and repulsion, its force of 
excitation. This quality of the fact does not stem from its established factuality, but from its eluding 
repression and crossing the strata of the protective onion.”64  
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36 
However, as Margaret Canovan has suggested, what usually is left out in the literature is 
the extent to which the forces of totalitarianism indeed dramatically and idiosyncratically shaped 
Arendt’s entire philosophical corpus. In a word, totalitarianism forced Arendt to examine the 
bounds between the private world of the mind and the public world of appearance. Canovan 
claims, contra Lyotard, that her thought is consequently “consistently inward-looking,” always stressing 
a “commitment to take responsibility for what was happening in the world instead of surrendering 
in the face of supposedly inevitable trends, and collective fantasies.”65 Arendt’s theory suggests 
that, in order for totalitarianism to ferment, its “onion structure” must destroy man’s inevitable 
‘desire’ to explode the real conditions of oppression and inequality in the social world. For it is 
only by calling forth these historical moments of rupture that one harkens the political debate 
which destroys the old and births the new. The Arendtian concept of political action, a truly 
spontaneous and unpredictable facet of humanness, has the capacity to reveal the real conditions of 
oppression, domination, and lack present within social life. As she writes in 1958 shortly after her 
publication of Origins, political action and speech are the vehicles through which one reveals the 
changing conditions in the world: “The human sense of reality demands that men actualize the 
sheer passive givenness of their being, not in order to change it, but in order to make articulate and 
call into full existence what otherwise they would have to suffer passively anyhow [italics added].”66 The concept 
of the ‘human world’, for Arendt, is not to serve a particular socially constructed end, but to 
provide the chance for human beings to use politics to uncover and find new answers to the 
inevitable and changing forms of domination in social and political life.  Humans need to act and 
speak in the public space to affirm their freedom. Arendt is thus consistent in arguing that political action 
arises (to use Lyotard’s terminology) because of a fundamental “anxiety” and our concomitant “attraction and 
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repulsion” with respect to the ‘real’ conditions that disgust and excite - it is this feeling which moves us to act. 
Viewed within the broader framework of Arendt’s philosophical oeuvre, she suggests that 
totalitarianism itself buries this subjective political desire to “to call into full existence” those 
conditions which our conceptualization through language can no longer adequately express.  
 But if Arendt’s central claim is that totalitarianism buries the subjective political desire to 
expose unseen conditions of oppression and strife in everyday normative claims, what in 
totalitarianism actually blankets the repression of something Arendt sees to be a natural political 
tendency? In other words, if desire in the political sense is eradicated, what form does ‘desire’ take in 
totalitarianism -- what explains the subjective capitulation to and endorsement of ‘total domination’?  
To answer this question, we will need to demonstrate Arendt’s implicit linkage between state 
domination, existing social flows and beliefs, and the individual subject. In what follows, I will 
consider Arendt‘s socio-psychological insights into the subjective capitulation to totalitarianism, 
and focus on two conditions of Arendt’s analysis. First, it will be important to localize the forces 
which ultimately led to the subject’s isolation and atomization from the political space and his 
concomitant loneliness within the private realm, which altogether provided the necessary impotence 
for totalitarian domination. If we contextualize Arendt’s theory within her broader philosophical 
thought, it becomes clear that Arendt actually identified in pre-totalitarian Europe a latent 
melancholia with respect to the ‘inability to mourn the loss of political action.’ The psychic 
consequences of this gradual retreat from the tasks of social and political transformation reveals a 
tendency towards objectivity and fantastical enjoyment. Second, I will consider Arendt’s appraisal 
of the bourgeois politics of surplus capital as the essential seed which produced a ‘superfluous 
humanity’ found in totalitarianism. It is here that I will draw a connection between Arendt’s claim 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis: because surplus capital is driven by the desire for surplus enjoyment, 
we can uncover the fundamental element of jouissance that is lacking in Arendt’s analysis. 
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Throughout this section, it is important to bear in mind that, for Arendt, while totalitarianism 
indeed sprang from real socio-political conditions, its “genocidal mentality” emerged from a 
deeply embedded historical imaginary, which was limited to a certain fantasy that refused exposure 
to the real social experiences of difference and inequality. 
It was after all the “genocidal mentality” of totalitarianism which became the driving force 
behind Arendt’s desire to write Origins.67  In 1943, after learning about Auschwitz, Arendt writes: 
“It was really as if an abyss had opened [...] This ought not to have happened. And I don‘t mean 
just the number of victims. I mean the method, the fabrication of corpses and so on [...] 
Something happened there to which we cannot reconcile ourselves. None of us ever can.“68  What 
could explain the univocal “need for terror” present within totalitarianism? Arendt suggests the 
masses openly endorsed totalitarianism out of the desire to become the walking embodiment of 
the Law of History or Nature.  Consequently, human spontaneity, unpredictability and plurality 
had to be sacrificed to a totalitarian collective imaginary: totalitarian terror was needed, in other 
words, to offset the persistent “fear that with the birth of each human being a new beginning 
might raise and make heard its voice in the world.”69  
 However, in order to understand this “need for terror,” we must first examine Arendt’s 
argument concerning the psychic ‘preparation’ for totalitarianism. It becomes evident that her 
contention that the gradual isolation from public politics and the concomitant loss of the 
‘protection’ ensured by a common body politic closely reflects a diagnosis of ‘melancholia’, 
described first by Freud in his essay Mourning and Melancholia (1917).  This latent melancholia 
emerged along two planes within the European nation-state: intellectual life and public life. First, 
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Arendt indicts the Western tradition of philosophy itself as being the possible precursor to mass-
loneliness after thinkers following Plato posited the existence of the ‘few against the many’. At the 
end of Origins, Arendt reminds us of what Hegel famously uttered on his deathbed: “Nobody has 
understood me except one; and he also misunderstood.”70 By insisting that the philosophical way 
of life was supreme the philosopher consequently lost any connection with the vita activa itself.  In 
her “Lectures on the Political Philosophy of Kant” given at The New School for Social Research 
in Fall, 1970, which would have established the framework of the uncompleted third installment to 
The Life of Mind, “Judging,” Arendt reflects on the meaning of melancholia as the loss of sociability 
[Geselligkeit] with the common world and the resultant feeling of loneliness and desolation. It was 
in Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment (The Critique of Judgment) that Arendt saw an attempt to 
overcome the melancholia of the professional thinker.71  Kant was one of the first thinkers to suggest 
that anyone could experience the life of the thinker, who observes and judges the world. His 
thought was that the “narrow footpath for the few would become a high-road [for all],”72 which 
means to enjoy the pleasure of being an impartial spectator and judge as a “member of a 
community.” But since the spectator is autonomous and therefore stands apart from the actual 
course of history, Arendt argues that Kantian political judgment (had he developed such) is wholly 
aesthetic; that is to say, to judge the beautiful and the ugly is carried out in private and deals 
ultimately with particulars; however, the feeling or ‘taste’ that overcomes us does not arrive by 
subsuming the particular under a universal concept (‘All roses are beautiful; this is a red rose; it 
must be beautiful.’). What grants us pleasure in judging, for both Kant and Arendt, is the feeling of 
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“approbation,” or the feeling that our taste is in some way ‘universally communicable’.  However, 
the century following the Enlightenment only proved to contradict Kant’s political 
conceptualization. The steady decline of autonomous political action and the possibility for 
communicative freedom, which began in the 1870s and lasted until the rise of totalitarianism, in 
fact only became manifest after the fall of Nazism and Stalinism. Arendt posited that the historical 
time period between the end of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth 
century had foreshadowed the catastrophes of the 1930s, because these years revealed a collection 
of political bodies in Europe that were “held together only by customs and traditions”: the body 
politic had run out of justifications for its practices and “The very sources from which such 
answers should have sprung had dried up. The very framework within which understanding and 
judging arise is gone.”73   
The second precursor to mass-melancholia developed within the sphere of public affairs 
due to the steady retraction and crippling of a common body politic. To understand Arendt’s 
thought here, it will be important to clearly define the Arendtian concept of action. In The Human 
Condition, she suggests that action (what she understands to be both deed and speech) reveals the 
public appearance of an autonomous actor because it is the introduction of the novum, the 
unexpected, within human plurality. Action, as we saw in Arendt’s reading of Kant, cannot be 
carried out in isolation, but requires an audience of spectators. The possibility for communicative 
freedom -- to have oneself heard and seen within the world -- sets the stage for public appearance 
and political action, because it is only then that actors can introduce “their own ideas about the 
possibilities of democratic government under modern conditions.”74  
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Arendt suggests, however, that, from the late nineteenth century until the rise of Nazism, 
the political space was gradually seized and constricted by a newly emerging European bourgeoisie 
and the growing dominance of xenophobic national political movements. As both Habermas and 
Arendt point out, bourgeois culture had taken on a new shape by the end of the nineteenth 
century. With the influence of Enlightenment thought on European politics, the public sphere of 
the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century was characterized by rational-critical debate in 
the salons, clubs and reading societies. Moreover, the public sphere had been thought of as not 
being limited to the modes of mere production, consumption and labor, or what Arendt and 
Habermas see as the “dictates of life’s necessities,” which directly opposes the critical action and 
speech of public politics. Bourgeois, along with all other strata of society, had been conscious of a 
dichotomous identity, consisting of the private Self (property owner as ‘human being’) and the 
public Self (bourgeois and homme). However, when the intimacy of the family unit was foreclosed by 
the collision of public and private, the public space of open debate and criticism dwindled as it 
increasingly became the game of social reproduction. The depoliticization of the public sphere 
resulted in what both Arendt and Habermas have called a “psychological facilitation” of consumer 
culture in the place of literary and political debate.75  
The great success of the new bourgeois politics was in collapsing the space between the 
political realm and the social realm. In effect, the invasion of the private realm into the public 
space and vice versa meant the eventual loss of the political fabric of plurality and equality.  Arendt 
called attention to the decline of the autonomous individual, the insurgence of the European mob 
and the concomitant diminishment of shared spaces – alternative or subaltern publics – in civil 
society. Consequently, large numbers of lonely individuals – those who, due to both economic and 
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social upheaval, failed to find a particular social class or group with which to identify – emerged on 
the scene.  
The possibility for the unpredictability and novelty of political action and speech was 
eventually lost after the focus within the nation-state became increasingly aimed at fostering an a 
priori, psychological picture of what it meant to be a part of the body politic itself – a direct 
product of European imperialism.  According to Arendt, the capitalist-imperialist had never 
sought dominance within public politics, since the individualism of capitalism and imperialism had 
stood directly opposed to the critical and open debate within politics.  The imperialist obsession 
with capitalist consumerism had been relegated largely to the private spheres of the social labor 
market. However, with the Stock Market crash of 1873 as well as the already collapsed “divide” 
between the private and the public, the capitalist-imperialist entered the scene of newly “privatized 
politics” in order to finance the expansion of capitalist goals which were fused with nationalist 
ideological pursuits.  In other words, public politics readily absorbed an “internalized tribal 
consciousness”, which proved to permeate both political and social life: “tribal nationalism” was 
to be distinguished from former identifications with the nation-state because it concentrated not 
on “visible existence, tradition, institutions, and culture,” but on the internal “soul which is 
considered as the embodiment of general national qualities.”76 Politically, it eliminated 
communicative freedom between a plurality of actors because it “deni[ed] theoretically the very 
possibility of a common mankind long before it [was] used to destroy the humanity of man.” The 
gradual retraction of the political space -- that place where one is emancipated from the private 
world of society and reveals himself as an equal through speech and deed -- made human action 
virtually meaningless. Instead of the ‘right to have rights’ as an inhabitant within the state, political 
status merely meant to “embody” a pre-fixed label which demarcated one as ‘naturally’ belonging 
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to the body politic because of race or nationality. The form of public life and communicative 
freedom possible within the public space of plurality that had thrived in European salons, theatres 
and cafes during the 18th century was eventually lost (even if groups, such as the European Jewry, 
had been exoticized and consequently set apart from standard European social class-based 
society).77 Consequently, Arendt saw that the space which could potentially ensure the much 
needed escape from the inevitable “inequality present in rulership”78 in the private sphere slowly 
dissipated into the hands of a select few bourgeois imperialists.  
The Pan-Movement ideologies that dominated politics in the decades leading up to 
totalitarianism were, however, only the products of European imperialism. Arendt suggests that, 
when the bourgeois-imperialist assumed control of politics in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, he advanced not only the universal and totalizing ideologies of the Pan-Movements, but 
also his desire to use politics for the accrual of surplus capital. The bourgeois-imperialist’s “apathy 
and even hostility toward public life” finally became the winning ethos of the nation: “the 
individual’s success or failure in ruthless competition” and labor proffered the mentality that “a 
citizen’s duties and responsibilities could only be felt to be a needless drain on his limited time and 
energy.”79  The individual citizen consequently no longer felt attached or personally responsible to 
the body politic.  However, the loss of the possibility for autonomous action in the political space, 
meant that the individual was forced to withdraw from the world of appearances and his relations 
with the common body politic. This disengagement with the outside world was massaged by the 
objective mandates of ideology, which gave the illusion of ‘mass political action’, but in fact only 
atomized human communities, thus permanently silencing the “potential space of appearance 
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between acting and speaking men.”80 Any sense of politics was subsumed by the institutions of 
bureaucratic state domination (rule by ‘no one’) and elite control.  
It became impossible to mourn the loss of the ability to act in the public realm and to affirm 
one’s own freedom because the proliferation of European mass society and mass consumption 
effectively sheathed the real (unconscious) loss of political space. A “coming-to-terms-with-the-
past” or “working-through-repressed-memory” (Freud’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung) could never be 
fully accomplished because, as Arendt makes clear, the leveling of a political and public arena 
destroyed that in which one could potentially scythe through the traumas and losses of political life. 
Consequently, the same appearance of ego-masochism characteristic of melancholia befell “the 
psychology of the European mass man”: self-centeredness and withdrawal from the world, a 
feeling of individual failure, and the weakening of the instinct for self-preservation.81 
Totalitarianism was, for Arendt, fueled by the unconscious fear of spontaneous human action. And as she 
suggests in Essays In Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, “fear” is 
“precisely despair over the impossibility of action.”82 The latent substructure prior to totalitarianism 
revealed for Arendt a certain despair concerning the ‘loss’ of the freedom-protecting ability to act.  
Because the subject was unable to overcome this ‘loss’, we are able to say that Arendt actually saw 
a form of melancholia within the masses in the decades before totalitarianism -- “the impossibility of 
mourning the past presence (and reapplying its force, through new object, to the present self) 
[...]”83 For Arendt, the melancholic subject must remain fixated on the Heideggerian notion of 
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human death, unable to cathect new objects within the world and to ‘birth’ a different being. The 
antipode which compels individuals past sameness, however, is the ‘law of mortality.’84 
Life itself, she argues, is grounded in the human miracle of action and birth, which, “in the 
ineluctable and natural ruin, would interrupt, begin something new, and be improbable, giving 
substance to faith and hope.”85 Lyotard in fact situates his own notion of enfance within Arendt’s 
principle of nativity, which is conceptually linked to human change and renewal (something which 
Lyotard claims resides within all of us). Thus, human birth is radical in that it cannot escape the 
inclination towards human action, which is “the virtue of a redemption -- a virtue I would call 
protective.”86 Action becomes ‘protective’, according to Lyotard, because it is able not only to 
sustain but to give essence and color to human life, interrupting “the ineluctable process of 
deadening” that was indicative of the very ‘sameness and superfluousness’ found within 
totalitarianism. Action saves what is distinct about politics: human plurality and change. We realize 
our freedom to act in the world through our conscious acknowledgment as an autonomous person, 
that individualism is always nestled within the context of, resting upon, as it were, a distinct otherness. As Arendt 
writes in The Life of the Mind concerning the distinct ‘otherness’ (the two-in-one) necessary for 
political thinking and action: 
In brief, the specifically human actualization of consciousness in the thinking dialogue 
between me and myself suggests that difference and otherness [italics added], which are such 
outstanding characteristics of the world of appearances as it is given to man for his habitat 
among a plurality of things, are the very conditions for the existence of man’s mental ego 
as well, for this ego actually exists only in duality [...] The partner who comes to life when 
you are alert and alone is the only one from whom you can never get away -- except by 
ceasing to think.87 
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There is, for Arendt, the “equally impressive evidence for the existence of an innate impulse [called] 
‘the urge to self-display’ (Selbstdarstellung).88” We are always desiring to project into the outside world 
the two-in-one within ourselves, what simultaneously binds us to the outside world and leaves the 
impression of an individual uniqueness in the world. However, if thinking and acting are always 
contingent upon the Other present in consciousness, it is fair to say that the ego, even in Arendt’s 
analysis, is not completely sovereign. As Freud famously put it, “Das Ich ist nicht Herr im eigenen 
Haus.”89 While Freud argues that we may not even be aware of the Other contained in the stories 
we tell ourselves, making us determined by the subtexts present within our unconscious, there is 
no need to conflate the difference between Arendt’s and Freud’s findings. Both suggest that 
‘narration’ is a project of recollection and retrieval, and that one can have access to the distinct 
otherness in our thinking. For Arendt, the ‘two-in-one’ is an irreplaceable part of the political 
imaginary because it is only then that men within a political body realize that “not Man but men 
inhabit the earth.”  It is only through the protection of political action that human plurality and the 
possibility to appear in a world composed of others can be saved.   
We can finally say that Arendt implicitly identified that the endorsement of totalitarian 
terror was, in part, due to a certain “incommunicable grief” and melancholia which had plagued 
the European nation-state in the decades leading up to the political catastrophes of the 1930s.  
Thus, the loss of the ability to act and speak in political discourse with the Other - “to have 
oneself heard and seen” - was thrown back upon the individual, finally rendering him not only isolated 
but lonely and forgotten.  The lost object subsequently became repressed into the unconscious of 
the subject, making it impossible for him to realize that his actions were driven by the unconscious 
despair over the inability to act. In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud tells us that melancholic 
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regression, resulting from either the loss of a loved one or a more abstract loss of freedom, 
fatherland, or ideal, compounds in the sublimation of a feeling of abandonment. Consequently, a 
loss of interest in the outside world and unjustified loss of self-esteem dominated the ego. As 
Freud points out, “In mourning, the world has become impoverished and empty, during 
melancholia, it is the ego itself.” Through an unconscious, narcissistic identification, the subject 
links his own ego with the now-hated object to which he remains more attached than ever; 
however, “if the love for the object – a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is 
given up – takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this 
substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from 
its suffering.”90  The melancholic, driven by the unconscious inability to mourn the loss of the 
original object, can only be temporarily satisfied through the defense of narcissistic regression, 
characterized by the sadistic, enjoyable punishing of the original object.  Julia Kristeva has aptly 
characterized melancholia as ‘hidden yet powerful,’ paralyzing the subject through the loss of:  
[...] all interest in words, actions, and even life itself [but] if loss, bereavement, and absence trigger 
the work of the imagination and nourish it permanently as much as they threaten it and 
spoil it, it is also noteworthy that the work of art as fetish emerges when the activating 
sorrow has been repudiated. The artist consumed by melancholia is at the same time the most 
relentless in his struggle against the symbolic abdication that blankets him . . . Until death strikes or 
suicide becomes imperative for those who view it as a final triumph over the void of the 
lost object. 91  
 
It was only in the few years before 1933 that Arendt claims the veil was lifted regarding the 
subject’s latent despair over the loss of politics and the ability to act. While relative prosperity had 
befallen Europe, most notably in 1920s Weimar Germany, the Great Depression after 1929 awoke 
the masses to the apparent realities of the nation-state: “the fall of protecting [economic] class 
walls transformed the slumbering majorities behind all parties into one great unorganized, 
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structureless mass of furious individuals who had nothing in common except their vague 
apprehension that the hopes of party members were doomed.”92 The subject’s still looming 
melancholic “radical loss of self-interest”93 and “perverse self-hatred of the spirit,” had “accounted 
for the delight with which the elite accepted the ‘ideas’ of the mob.”94 In other words, the 
melancholic condition of the subject left him vulnerable to the seemingly objective ideals and 
fantasies espoused by the totalitarian imaginary.  
To alleviate the feeling of ‘loss’, totalitarianism provided an avenue through which the 
subject was effectively able to punish the original ‘failed and lost’ world of real economic, social and 
political conditions, which he felt abandoned him in the first place, but this time with a crucial 
caveat: the responsibility and hate for the lost object is no longer felt as a drain on the conscious 
ego, but rather is projected onto the imaginary object of phantasy -- ‘the Jew’.  Through the work 
of Julia Kristeva, we have access to the insight that one’s inability to acknowledge the otherness in 
oneself, which undergirds the political imaginary, will manifest itself in the ‘urge’ to remove 
oneself from the other - projecting it onto a contrived phantasy concerning the world.95 In order 
for totalitarianism to be successful in its attack against the real world, it must supply the subject 
with an equally tantalizing phantasy which conceals the fundamental ‘loss of world’ and of human 
action. Thus, narcissism, a sociopathic disorder ranging from the interpersonal to the international 
level, can be found within totalitarianism, whose imperative is always that ideological fantasy must 
have absolute supremacy over the wants and needs of the citizenry: the subject’s ego remains 
impoverished because of the obsessive devotion to the phantastical object.96 Here we can use the 
conceptual analysis of phantasy developed by Lacan in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
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Psychoanalysis.  The totalitarian phantasy must conceal the fundamental ‘lack’ of real freedom, 
action and world (characterized by plurality and spontaneity) and the ultimate impossibility of a 
whole, ‘utopian’ society: “The place of the real, which stretches from the trauma to the phantasy -- 
in so far as the phantasy is never anything more than the screen that conceals something quite 
primary, something determinant in the function of repetition [...] governs our activities more than 
any other.97 I would thus like to briefly explain how subjective identity would appear in symptoms 
such as jouissance and melancholia, and that mechanisms such as projection and introjection are at 
work in our relations to others.  
To demonstrate this, I propose that we turn to a crucial point in Arendt’s reflections on 
the dilemmas of the modern-nation state: the encounter with the “non-European Other” through 
imperialism created unconscious race patterns within the home country. Racism began to undercut 
the political practices of the nation-state in the latter-half of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries.  “The ideology which interprets history as an economic struggle of classes,” 
claims Arendt, “and the other that interprets history as a natural fight of races,” had embedded 
themselves into the public discourse by the outbreak of Stalinism and Nazism, so that “not only 
intellectuals but great masses of people will no longer accept a presentation of past or present facts 
that is not in agreement with either of these views.”98  Arendt insists that ‘race-thinking’ was born 
out of the imperialistic desire for a totalizing national ‘tribal consciousness’, which would 
distinguish the race of civilized men from ‘the Other’ inhabiting the colonial world. Using Hobbes 
to explain the theoretical foundation for these ‘naturalistic ideologies,’ Arendt contends that 
nations began to see one another as tribes, “separated from each other by nature, without any 
connection whatever, unconscious of the solidarity of mankind and having in common only the 
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instinct for self-preservation.”99  The race-mentality of imperialism made it possible for the nation-
state to build a citizenry based not on common tradition and law, but on the particular 
psychological condition of race, so, “in the social sphere, nature itself was supposed to supply a 
title when political reality had refused it.”100  
‘The Jew’ had always existed outside existing social classes in European nation-states. 
Consequently, he could be easily seen as a figure of difference within society, beginning most 
notably in the eighteenth century. This difference, according to Arendt, was largely rooted in 
financial stereo-typology:  
This kind of relationship between Jews and aristocracy was the only one that ever tied a 
Jewish group to another stratum in society. After it disappeared in the early nineteenth 
century, it was never replaced. Its only remnant for the Jews was a penchant for 
aristocratic titles (especially in Austria and France), and for the non-Jews a brand of liberal 
anti-semitism which lumped Jews and nobility together and pretended that they were in 
some kind of financial alliance against the rising bourgeoisie.101  
 
Weimar Germany from 1924 to 1929 ushered in a period of relative growth and prosperity, which 
was strengthened by a boom in heterogenous national art and literature.102 However, to argue that 
Weimar Germany saw an increase in public political life seems to be false. In reality, the twenties 
emerged as a cloud of ignorant bliss, whereby the prior, unsolved political (and economic) problems 
entered the years of “stabilization.” Consequently, the individual’s actual lost cathexis with the 
political body itself was effectively concealed by the soothsaying of European mass culture.  The 
neue Sachlichkeit of the 1920s produced the unforeseen proliferation of European mass society, 
characterized by the rapid spread of “mass marching columns, huge rallies, great sporting events 
and mass spectacles in the theatre, as well as of mass production in industry and mass construction 
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in the new architecture,” the very function of which was “to generate a huge, choreographed 
totalitarian spectacle.”103  After the economic crisis in Europe following the stock market collapse 
of 1929, however, the call for totalitarianism emerged as a result of the mass plea for a space 
which would provide the much needed ‘escape’ from the oppression and inequality sweeping 
through Europe. Since the body politic itself could not exercise real catharsis, the masses endorsed 
totalitarian imaginary as the much needed retreat from the outside world.104 Drawing upon the 
latent, imperialistic ‘race-thinking’ and anti-semitism in European culture, Arendt argues that ‘the 
Jew’ entered the scene of European society as that which was wrong with the new world of mass 
culture and mass consumption: ‘the Jew’ as financier and shopkeeper symbolized the errant 
bourgeois capitalism that had polluted politics. In this way, ‘the Jew’ became the ‘answer’ to the 
human ‘loss’ of the world. With the growing distaste for bourgeois capitalism and spoiled politics, 
notions which became attached to ‘the Jew’, it became easy for the anti-semite to depreciate those 
features of ‘the Jew’ which in fact closely reminded him of his own traits. Because the state had 
appeared to protect the Jews through their historical financial alliances, the Jews could be easily 
identified with failing politics and state power:  
There can be no doubt that in the eyes of the mob the Jews came to serve as an object lesson for 
all things they detested [italics added]. If they hated society they could point to the way in 
which the Jews were tolerated within it; and if they hated the government they could point 
to the way in which the Jews had been protected by or were identifiable with the state.105 
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It is important to bear in mind here just how closely Arendt understood and diagnosed modern 
anti-semitism as the lack of mental reflection and as the structuring of the world independent of 
experiences between groups or classes; while it had no doubt started as a response to original 
social and political conflicts with Jews themselves (e.g. the Dreyfus Affair), anti-semitism was 
launched to the degree of abstraction - “the Jew everywhere” could become the walking 
embodiment of any particular quality now.106 However, she also finds that what became tied to 
this withdrawal into fantastical, anti-semitic ideology was the projection of ‘loss’ onto ‘the Jew’. As 
Julia Schulze Wessel and Lars Rensmann point out, “Although Arendt does not like the term 
because of its psychological character and connotations, one may say that according to Arendt, the 
mob projected its own condition on the Jews, who were seen as both all too familiar and all to 
different.”107 Here we  discover the possible parallel between Arendt and Adorno’s thought. Both 
theorists recognized that the loss of politics and the possibility for action was transferred to ‘the 
Jew’ as the one who perpetrated this loss. Adorno and Arendt stress the fact that socialized and 
politicized paranoia must mean the exclusion of reflection in favor for the “psychological quality” 
of “Jewishness.”108 That is to say, the indictment of ‘the Jew’ lacks the mediation between 
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perception and object and focuses solely on an a priori objective quality about him. An unreflected 
false projection, for Adorno, is thus 
[...] the reverse of genuine mimesis and has deep affinities to the repressed; in fact, it may 
itself be the pathic character trait in which the latter is precipitated. If mimesis makes itself 
resemble its surroundings, false projection makes its surroundings resemble itself. If, for 
the former, the outward becomes the model to which the inward clings, so that the alien 
becomes the intimately known, the latter displaces the volatile inward into the outer world, 
branding the intimate friend as foe.109 
 
As the gap between the subject and the object is closed off to mediation, the space is filled by the 
fantastical image of ‘the Jew’, thus fulfilling a crucial psychological function. Both Adorno and 
Arendt find that the projection and paranoia characteristic of anti-semitic ideology grew 
successfully out of a bed of loneliness, isolation and atomization: anti-semitism was tolerated in 
the social world where Jews actually were submerged; it would work even better in a world where 
they did not exist at all.  
  Žižek has illuminated this notion, that the reason for the success of antisemitism in 
totalitarianism is the use of ‘the Jew’ to create the fantasy of a whole and perfect society. The 
secret behind totalitarianism is that it fundamentally needs ‘the Jew’ in order to disguise the 
impossibility of a ‘whole’ society based on one race. For Arendt, the reality of the world is 
‘plurality’, which can only be fully discovered if one transcends the veil of totalitarian ideology and 
ascends into the political realm, where freedom springs from human action and never through 
mechanical, instrumental labor. ‘The Jew’ becomes a necessary fantasy figure because he actually 
represents the fundamental impossibility of totalitarianism to provide a perfect society void of 
plurality: without ‘the Jew’ totalitarian society would have nothing on which to base itself. Indeed, 
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“it is as if in the figure of ‘the Jew’ this impossibility had acquired a positive, palpable existence - 
and that is why it marks the eruption of enjoyment in the social field.”110 
However, ‘the Jew’ is like any other fantastical image -- i.e. Latinos, Africans, homosexuals, 
gypsies, and women -- which have historically been used in societies to give the illusion of a more 
fulfilled, complete society. Indeed, we must turn to a more fundamental element underlying 
Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism, which would explain the totalitarian obsession with ‘human 
superfluousness,’ the fundamental desire to render any portion of the population, including 
oneself, useless. The logical end of totalitarian ideology is, therefore, that if each human being is 
assigned a certain use-value according to his role as embodying the Law of History or Nature, then 
anyone can potentially be eliminated as soon as his value no longer ‘serves the purpose’ of the Law. 
But who would find enjoyment in such a world?   
 
 
III.      Jouissance and a Superfluous Humanity: Surplus-Capital, Surplus-Enjoyment, 
Surplus-People  
 
Hannah Arendt differentiated herself from the majority of the members of the Frankfurt 
School not only in her disdain for psychoanalysis and mass-psychology, but also in her sharp 
critique of Marxism, which notably informed much of the School’s philosophical inquiries. She 
argued that Marxism was one of the first ‘popular ideologies’ embraced by the People which 
falsely subsumed the whole of history under the guise of economic ‘class-struggle’. For Arendt, the 
tendency to abstract and subsume particulars under the heading of a universal claim, such as man’s 
natural proclivity to emancipate himself from the constraints of bourgeois imperialism, had 
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become one of the elements rooting totalitarian ideology, because it turned individual human 
beings into mere cogs in the wheel of history and took politics to be a function of the ruling class. 
Moreover, Arendt did not see the nation-state to be a product of capitalism. Marxism 
argued that the only way the labor alienation within capitalism would be the establishment of a 
new, proletariat-led state. As Seyla Benhabib has put it, Arendt figured that the nation-state, 
founded on the tenets of universal equality and the protection of the rights of Man and Citizen, 
was facing a losing battle to the forces of capitalism and imperialism.111 Arendt stresses that the 
nation-state, or at least its political body, was doomed to fail especially after World War I given the 
inherent conflict between capitalism’s desire for endless accumulation of land and labor and its 
founding political principle of consent within a stable sphere of speech and action. There is no need 
for political consent amongst different-minded citizens if the nation-state seems already to follow its own inherent logic, 
driven by the “unlimited power” of a particular class of individuals (either the bourgeois capitalists or the proletariat 
laborers).  
However, in one of her more Marxist-inspired veins of thought, she argues in Origins that 
totalitarianism was not simply a failure of the Enlightenment -- the acceptance of Romanticism 
and the failure of liberalism. It was rather deeply truncated in the capitalist desire for imperialist 
expansion which had come to dominate the nation-state. Not surprisingly, Arendt sides with Rosa 
Luxemburg’s Marxist inspired understanding of the structural dynamics governing capitalist 
expansionism, that capitalism essentially depends upon surplus people and territory to satisfy the 
desire for surplus value and overproduction. “Capitalism” wrote Rosa Luxemburg,  
arises and develops historically amidst a non-capitalist society. In Western Europe it is 
found at first in a feudal environment from which it in fact sprang – the system of 
bondage in rural areas and the guild system in the towns – and later, after having 
swallowed up the feudal system, it exists mainly in an environment of peasants and artisans, 
that is to say a system of simple commodity production both in agriculture and trade. 
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European capitalism is further surrounded by vast territories of non-European civilization 
ranging over all levels of development […] This is the setting for the accumulation of 
capital […] The existence and development of capitalism requires an environment of non-
capitalist forms of production […] Capitalism needs non-capitalist social strata as a market 
for its surplus-value, as a source of supply for its means of production and as a reservoir of 
labour power for its wage system.112 
 
Arendt’s agreement with this thesis, which she calls “Rosa Luxemburg’s brilliant insight into the 
political structure of imperialism,”113 allowed her to see capitalism and imperialism as essential to 
the widespread acceptance of a ‘superfluous humanity’ in totalitarianism.  
Thus, while Arendt is normally viewed as a direct opponent of Marxist theorists, this fails 
to recognize her oftentimes overlooked ability to enlist Marxist thought to diagnose totalitarianism. 
Arendt had detected that it was the bourgeois desire for surplus capital which had created the desire 
for a surplus humanity. I propose that Slavoj Žižek’s insights into Lacanian psychoanalytic theory 
and capitalism can actually grant us the conceptual tools necessary to build upon Hannah Arendt’s 
theory of totalitarianism by answering the question of jouissance within totalitarianism. In short, 
Arendt came close to assessing the linkage between capitalist and totalitarian desire and enjoyment. 
She extends the Marxist account of capitalism’s never-ending process of exploitation of ‘surplus-
people’ to totalitarianism, arguing that capitalist imperialism produced the law that “expansion is a 
psychological necessity before it is a political device.”114 
However, if the ‘secret’ of totalitarianism is, for Arendt, that the subject is being driven by 
a latent despair over the loss of human action, a fundamental ‘lack’ of human action and 
togetherness, would it not seem probable that the same ‘enjoyment’ in capitalism would provide 
the same ‘enjoyment’ to Arendt’s lonely mass man? What could explain the conscious enjoyment of the 
subject’s open endorsement of fascism, the fact that “within the organizational framework of the 
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movement, so long as it holds together, the fantasized members can be reached by neither 
experience nor argument; identification with the movement and total conformism seem to have 
destroyed the very capacity for experience, even if it be as extreme as torture or the fear of 
death.”115  I would first like to situate Arendt’s argument concerning the “banality of evil” within 
her later contention in The Life of the Mind that enjoyment in the world arises through 
intersubjectivity, through appearing to others. It is here that Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism can 
be implicitly linked to subjective jouissance. In his book Violence, Žižek has suggested a similar 
argument to Arendt’s theory of intersubjectivity, arguing that there is a fundamental feeling that all 
is wrong as soon as we introduce to ourselves the disjunction existing between what is ‘outside’ of 
us and our ‘true selves’. This is due to the fact that ‘who we are’ is actually the self which appears 
to the world outside of us.  Žižek crystallizes this point as he reflects on the nature behind Stalinist 
Communism:  
When, in the 1960s, Svetlana Stalin emigrated to the U.S. through India and wrote her 
memoirs, she presented Stalin “from inside” as a warm father and caring leader, with most 
of the mass murders imposed on him by his evil collaborators, Lavrenty Beria in particular. 
Later, Beria’s son Sergo wrote a memoir presenting his father as a warm family man who 
simply followed Stalin’s orders and secretly tried to limit the damage. Georgy Melenkov’s 
son Andrei also told the story, describing his father, Stalin’s successor, as an honest hard 
worker, always afraid for his life. Hannah Arendt was right: these figures were not 
personifications of sublime Byronesque demonic evil: the gap between their intimate experience 
and the horror of their acts was immense. The experience that we have of our lives from within, the story we 
tell ourselves about ourselves in order to account for what we are doing, is fundamentally a lie—the truth 
lies outside, in what we do.116 
 
For Žižek, the ‘internal lie’ is what reifies totalitarianism, because without it, no one would have 
any level of enjoyment in their existence, in what they are actually doing.  It is here that Žižek and 
Arendt strike a similar cord: “Refusing the same basic ethical rights to those outside our 
community as to those inside it is something that does not come naturally to a human being. It is a 
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violation of our spontaneous proclivity. It involves brutal repression and self-denial.”117 Arendt argues that in the 
political realm, action and speech shape one’s appearance in the world, thus satisfying his second 
‘self’ -- the public self. Our sense of enjoyment stems from the freedom realized through public 
appearance and action, and also from the narrative we tell ourselves concerning the appearance of 
our action in the world (this narrative, at least partially, must come to grips with the reality of the 
world).  But intersubjectivity of course requires the acknowledgment of the Other in order to 
formulate political judgments.  The nature of totalitarianism, for Arendt, is grounded upon world 
alienation, or the loss of an intersubjectively established world of experience which would give rise to self 
identity and a sense of reality.  Because totalitarianism cannot exist without this loss of 
intersubjectivity, any feeling of enjoyment in the world must be singly bound to the mass fantasy 
which is shared between individuals: they are no longer joined by a common reality, the world of 
plurality and action and speech, but rather by self-denial in favor of the ‘mass lie’ they all seem to 
share. Enjoyment no longer takes recourse to one’s ability to make oneself known within the 
world, but is reflected through the totalitarian narrative, which could never come to grips with the 
reality of the world.   
However, what is the nature and origin of this ‘mass lie’ shaping the totalitarian imaginary? 
Arendt provides the answer in her Marxist analysis of capitalist desire for surplus capital which 
eventually gave birth to the totalitarian desire for surplus people. The feeling of atomization, 
isolation and loneliness experienced by so many citizens in Europe after the failure of the First 
World War was, according to Arendt, spearheaded by an increasingly prevalent bourgeois, 
imperialist politics of superfluous capital. “Superfluousness” is the word of choice for Arendt 
because it connotes feeling that “everything is possible.” Although Arendt uses the term liberally 
to describe the conditions of domination of imperialism, capitalism and totalitarianism, she does 
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not explicitly note the terms loaded overtones of jouissance, whose French connotation is already 
imbued with the feeling of “overflowing.”  In The Life of the Mind, however, we do receive an idea 
of how Arendt may have understood the transcendent quality of surplus in her discussion of 
Nietzsche’s “overcoming”: “Surplus, according to Nietzsche as well as to Marx (the sheer fact of a 
surplus of labor left over after the requirements for the preservation of individual life and of 
species survival have been met), constitutes the conditio-per-quam of all culture.”118 Enjoyment in the 
surplus, in the overcoming of the merely apparent state, grows from the fact that the surplus itself is 
seemingly unending, that it is a Becoming not aimed at a final state.  
In imperialism this meant the “never-ending” accumulation of capital; however, in both 
imperialism and totalitarianism there emerged the common drive to own and control inferior 
peoples. When surplus value was expanded to include ‘human capital’ in imperialism, it made for 
the first time widespread the pathos that “they are superfluous and expendable” or, similarly, 
“human beings exist as objects” vis-à-vis the nation and Truth of imperialist race ideology. Arendt 
attempts to reveal the false universalization espoused by imperialist ideology, to show that the 
interest of the class of imperialists was behind the so-called ‘universal’ human interest of tribal 
consciousness.119 The new guiding principle of the nation-state was that human beings, namely those 
of the colonial world, were superfluous in the universal expansion of unlimited and superfluous 
power and capital. The enjoyment of life within the nation-state, undergirded by communicative 
freedom and public action, was given up for the surplus-enjoyment of superfluous power and 
capital, which was raised up as a universal law:  
Occasional warnings against the Lumpenproletariat, and the possible bribing of sections of 
the working class with crumbs from the imperialist table, did not lead to a deeper 
understanding of the great appeal which the imperialist programs had to the rank and file 
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of the party.  In Marxist terms the new phenomenon of an alliance between mob and 
capital seemed so unnatural, so obviously in conflict with the doctrine of class struggle, 
that the actual dangers of the imperialist attempt -- to divide mankind into master races 
and slave races, into higher and lower breeds, into colored peoples and white men, all of 
which were attempts to unify the people on the basis of the mob -- were completely 
overlooked.120 
 
Essential here is the two-sided situation between the masses and the elite capitalist Other ruling 
the government. In her writings concerning Marx, Arendt finds that it was Marxist philosophy 
which instigated the proliferation of a “laboring consciousness” within the burgeoning industrialized 
mass-society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  By emphasizing individual labor 
as the one and only way of differentiating oneself within the world, all other forms of life, most 
importantly for Arendt being political action and speech (which require the companionship of 
human plurality), were viewed as non-essential to the making of a whole society.  In other words, 
Marxism proffered a particular mentality that was not necessarily particular to an economic class, but 
to those who labored: the laborers could conceptualize their own superiority to those who did not - 
the imperialist bourgeoisie.  That this “consciousness” of labor infiltrated the masses of the 
nation-state several decades before the rise of totalitarianism, Arendt conceives that the masses’ 
distaste for bourgeois surplus capital sprang alongside the elite’s simultaneous surplus-enjoyment 
of surplus capital. When the imperialist bourgeoisie assumed control of politics, Arendt points out 
that politics came to be dominated by the very paradoxical principle governing capitalism: mere 
enjoyment in the politics of the nation-state was given up for a feeling of “overcoming,” the surplus-
enjoyment that emerged out of the endless surplus-capital accumulation.  
It is important to note that Arendt’s analysis understands that the same pathos present 
within capitalism’s surplus-value and surplus capital was at work in fascism’s appraisal of a 
superfluous humanity. However, as Slavoj Žižek points out, Marxism did not come to terms with the 
eternal homology within capitalism, between surplus-value, “the ‘cause’ which sets in motion the capitalist process of 
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production,” and surplus-enjoyment, “the object cause of desire.”121 Thus, we need to go further in our 
analysis to discuss what Arendt did not; that is, the actual forms of capitalist and fascist ideology 
command a similar, concomitant enjoyment that was actually the subjective object of desire.  The 
notion of “superfluous men” conceptualized from surplus capital can, then, be transferred to the 
Lacanian notion of “surplus enjoyment.” This would finally answer our original question for 
Arendt: how could the subjective sympathy towards and even ‘enjoyment’ of the totalitarian 
project be explained?    
In his seminar “The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,” Lacan developed the concept of surplus-
enjoyment or, more appropriately, surplus-jouissance, whose French meaning retains the sexual 
connotation.  The pleasure principle, according to Lacan, is the law that commands one to ‘enjoy 
as little as possible,’ since there is only a certain level of pleasure from a given object which can be 
extracted, after which one transgresses into pain. However, we are constantly seeking to press this 
boundary, attempting to obtain more pleasure; however, the result is the renunciation of actual 
pleasure in exchange for a certain amount of pain. To understand surplus-enjoyment, Žižek 
elaborates this point apropos of Coca-Cola as “surplus-enjoyment personified.” Coke itself does 
not seem to supply us with any particular use-value - i.e. its taste is not directly pleasing or satisfying, 
like water serves to quench our thirst:  
The unexpected result of this feature is not that, since Coke does not satisfy any concrete 
need, we drink it only as a supplement, after some other drink has satisfied our substantial 
need - rather, it is this very superfluous character that makes our thirst for Coke all the 
more insatiable: as Jacques-Alain Miller put it so succinctly, Coke has the paradoxical property 
that the more you drink the thirstier you get, the greater your need to drink more - with that strange, bitter-
sweet taste, our thirst is never effectively quenched.122  
 
Žižek reminds us that “Lacan modelled his notion of surplus-enjoyment on the Marxian 
notion of surplus-value,” since the very paradoxical logic of capitalism is that we renounce the actual 
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use-value of an object, ignoring the capitalist relations of production in favor of the surplus which 
yields our enjoyment:  
[...] it is not a surplus which simply attaches itself to some ‘normal’, fundamental 
enjoyment because enjoyment as such emerges only in this surplus, because it is 
constitutively an ‘excess’. If we subtract the surplus we lose enjoyment itself, just as 
capitalism, which can survive only by incessantly revolutionizing it own material conditions, 
ceases to exist if it ‘stays the same’, if it achieves an internal balance. This, then, is the 
homology between surplus-value - the ‘cause’ which sets in motion the capitalist process of 
production - and surplus-enjoyment, the object-cause of desire.123  
 
In other words, it is the form of the object itself which acts “as a motivating force driving us to 
obey its command,” instead of a set of positive reasons.  The “spirit of sacrifice” in capitalism 
ensures its perpetual movement: we give up enjoyment (the enjoyment provided through mere 
use-value, satisfying a need or lack, i.e. drinking water to satisfy thirst) so that we may transgress its 
limits and find the surplus-enjoyment.   
 However, as the imperialist capitalist ethos of surplus-capital took control of the politics of 
the nation-state in the decades leading up to totalitarianism, the masses’ developed an increasing 
distaste for bourgeois capitalist politics, since it became clear that it was only the bourgeois Other 
who could actually relish in surplus-enjoyment. The worker in capitalism “never enjoys that 
surplus product: he or she ‘loses’ it. The work process produces him or her as an ‘alienated’ 
subject, simultaneously producing a loss, (a). The capitalist, as Other, enjoys that excess product, 
and thus the subject finds him or herself in the unenviable situation of working for the Other’s 
enjoyment [...]”124 Just as we saw earlier that Arendt recognized the paranoiac projection of ‘loss’ 
of politics and the ability to act within the world onto the figure of ‘the Jew’, she understood 
further that ‘the Jew’ finally became identified with the corruption and failure of bourgeois 
capitalism. We can finally say that totalitarianism sold its ideology through the following formula: 
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have the same surplus-enjoyment of the bourgeoisie but in a world free of capitalist competitive 
class-struggle; renounce the mere use-value of yourself, surrender yourself to ideology and the 
state, and find the surplus-enjoyment in a surplus humanity.  
Thus, we find the same internal logic behind totalitarian ideology that exists within 
capitalism, which are both rooted in a “giving up” of mere enjoyment in the search for “never-
ending” surplus: Fascism commands “Obey, because you must! In other words, renounce 
enjoyment, sacrifice yourself and do not ask about the meaning of it - the value of the sacrifice lies in its 
very meaninglessness; true sacrifice is for its own end; you must find positive fulfillment in the sacrifice itself, not in its 
instrumental value: it is this renunciation, this giving up of enjoyment itself, which produces a certain 
surplus-enjoyment.”125 In other words, we may give meaning to Arendt’s otherwise vague 
expression – “expansion is a psychological necessity before it is a political device”126 – in claiming 
that ‘enjoyment’ in the sacrifice, in search for surplus-enjoyment, was the psychic condition 
imperialist capitalism brought to the nation-state. With the failure of bourgeois capitalism in the 
nation-state – its widespread corruption in state-politics and the economic failures after the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929 – totalitarianism ‘filled the gap’ in the subject’s search for surplus enjoyment: 
‘expansion’ for surplus capital was replaced with ‘expansion’ for surplus-people. With surplus-people as 
an answer to the “command” of ideology, totalitarianism could provide a means to surplus-
enjoyment.  
 
IV. Subjectivity, Desire and Emancipation: Hannah Arendt’s Politics 
 
 
So far we have examined the fruitful linkage between Arendt’s socio-historical analysis of 
totalitarianism and psychoanalysis. The gradual paralysis of the political sphere -- the lost 
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connection with the common world of public politics and the resultant withdrawal from the world 
of experience and appearances -- explained, for Arendt, the subject’s active role in the constitution 
of the totalitarian project. While Arendt proposed that the dwindling public sphere and lost 
connection with the world of politics created the mass-experience of loneliness and isolation (what 
she calls “world alienation” in The Human Condition), I have argued that Arendt’s thesis closely 
reflects a mass-melancholia – the inability to overcome the lost object of the nation-state as a 
protector of political freedoms.  Indeed, this line of argumentation is necessary if we want to 
understand exactly to what extent the ‘political unconscious’ identified by Arendt actually played a 
role in the active call for totalitarianism.   
Exactly because she chose to ignore this relationship, we must demonstrate exactly ‘how’ 
the subject became weakened and was left vulnerable to oppressive domination, even to the point 
of obscene jouissance. To this extent, it has become clear that the subject was unable to mourn the 
lost world of public freedom: as a result, the subject’s ability to enjoy the bilateral relationship 
between the intimacy of the private with the commonly created world of public equality and action 
was slowly squeezed into the unilateral jouissance of the ‘closed-circuit’ private world. Indeed, the 
subject could only cope by relishing in the fantasies of an ‘individual-based’ world -- superfluous 
material gain and individual labor.   
In effect, Arendt implicitly shows us that, if one considers the nature of the public space in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is necessary to include in this picture the move 
away from public life and the universal concern for communicative freedom to the privatized, 
capitalist business of superfluous jouissance.  However, I have tried to show that while Arendt 
herself attempted to draw the connection between surplus capital and surplus people, this linkage 
can only be properly explained by taking into account the psychic mechanisms constituting the 
private Self, isolated from the public space of action and rebirth. Even Arendt herself identified that 
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the depersonalized “private Self” was the emerging symptom of mass society and an already 
eroded public space vis-à-vis a burgeoning social sphere of inequality. However, Arendt was again 
in no place to make such a claim explicitly, since such pre-political “ugliness” was, for her part, 
“unappealing.”127 We must, then, show how both elements emerged out of a common desire for 
surplus-enjoyment. In capitalism, by giving up the use-value of an object, the capitalist buys into the 
fetish of the object itself, which promises to give the capitalist ‘more and more’ superfluous 
happiness (recall the Coke example). Such enjoyment, however, comes at a price: the capitalist 
remains perpetually ‘thirsty’ for more superfluousness. For Arendt, the same ethos emerged within 
imperialism, which not only was driven by the desire for useless wealth, but also for superfluous 
people. As in capitalism, imperialism held that, it was no longer good enough to enjoy the value of 
an individual human life for the nation-state, since public politics meant that men were viewed 
according to their own actions, and the use-value of their deeds and words was to realize human 
freedom in concert. Groups of men were imbued with an a priori fetishistic quality of tribal 
nationalism, whereby ‘more and more’ objectified men could be amassed (treated like commodities) 
exactly because it produced the feeling of surplus-enjoyment. In the final analysis, totalitarianism 
itself first emerged so powerfully because it was able to draw upon the subjects weakened state as 
being isolated from the common body politic. However, more importantly, the particular type of 
enjoyment totalitarianism engendered sprang from an already present principle within capitalism 
and imperialism: the limits to enjoyment which the boundedness of the nation-state commands could 
be superseded by the feeling of perpetually increasing enjoyment within the “onion-like structure” of the 
totalitarian imaginary128.   
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By articulating and rendering explicit the unspoken, unwritten (shall we say unconscious) 
psychoanalytic categories within Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism, I would like to extend this 
study to elements within Arendt’s larger discussion of political life, suggesting that Arendt’s 
political theory draws specifically on the notions of emancipation, freedom and intersubjectivity. 
In particular, I will argue that Arendt’s account of these concepts widens our notion of the 
political because the way in which she employs them is fundamentally informed by the same 
unspoken psycho-social introspection. However, first, let us clarify Arendt’s premises for why 
exactly the political space is so precious and yet so fragile.  
Arendt learned from totalitarianism that political actors come together because they want 
to act and speak, because they all want equally to be seen and heard within the world. Politics is 
not to bring about a particular telos or Spirit, but to make manifest the common desire for 
communicative freedom – which is not the ability to choose (liberum arbitrium) but rather the ability 
to birth new and unpredicted beginnings within the real sphere of human plurality – which would 
otherwise be silenced in the private realm.129 She makes a sharp distinction between public political 
life and the social and private spheres. Whereas the latter is regulated by the functional, obligatory 
and biological life-sustaining activities of work and labor, the former guarantees the subjective 
emancipation from the inevitable oppression and inequality of the social sphere.  
Citing Dante at the beginning of her chapter “Action” in The Human Condition, Arendt 
argues that the political space of appearance enables the disclosure of the subject through action 
and speech, or that “nothing acts unless [by acting] it makes patent its latent self (Nihil igitur agit nisi 
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tale existens quale patiens fieri debet.).”130  The political act is the ‘public symbol’ that demonstrates the 
actor’s “human passions which set it in motion,”131 his strength and desire to risk and begin an 
initiative whose consequences are boundless within the community. The public space of 
appearance, “where men are together in the manner of speech and action,” is not guaranteed by 
necessity (like the private sphere), but is only potential: the power that is created between acting men 
can decay and disappear when politics, for example, becomes dominated by single private matters 
of the social sphere (such as was the case before and within totalitarianism). Therefore, power is the 
single element of the political space which so vastly demarcates it from the social and private: 
human power cannot exist by itself within a single individual in isolation, but “springs up between 
men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.”132 The power that arises 
through political action may originally spring from the deed of one individual; however, its propensity 
for power is only due to its mutually shared significance as a story within the “web of human 
relationships.” That is to say, while the isolated man can only be strong, the man who acts in 
concert shares in the power that “can only be actualized but never fully materialized.” It is not the 
materially strong in politics who have power, but the men who ‘act’ together in order to resist 
oppression who represent “one of the most active and efficient ways of action ever devised.”133 
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I would like to suggest that part of the reason why Arendt believes men are inclined to 
transgress the social and private into the political sphere is fundamentally informed by the desire for 
emancipation and recognition. Actors desire the political, in other words, because the social world 
commands an immense repression of passions and self-expression; only the public space of 
politics promises the universal communicative freedom necessary to oppose the oppression and 
inequality of the private realm. For Arendt, the emancipatory power of politics enables new 
beginnings, “the confrontation of communicative power with the means of force of a coercive but 
impotent state apparatus.” Moreover, emancipation arises out of the mutual recognition between 
the Self and the Other, when equality is established out of intersubjective thinking. As Jürgen 
Habermas has suggested regarding Arendt’s understanding of the communicative generation of 
power,  
When revolutionaries seize power that lies in the streets; when a populace committed to 
passive resistance confronts alien tanks with their bare hands; when convinced minorities 
contest the legitimacy of existing laws and organize civil disobedience; when the ‘pure 
desire for action’ manifests itself in the student movement – these phenomena confirm 
again that no one really possesses power; it ‘springs up between men when they act 
together and vanishes the moment they disperse.’134 
 
One may still ask, why is action and, moreover, communicative freedom necessarily limited to the 
political realm (and not the social)? Said another way, why should the actor be motivated to enter 
the public realm in order to act. Arendt’s answer rests in her contention that actors are motivated by 
“the desire for pure action.” Let us consider the following dilemma concerning power with which 
the actor is confronted before his entrance into the public sphere of politics: in the social and 
private realm, one may act, but in doing so, can only display personal strength which is relatively 
minimal compared to the greatness and power actually desired; in the political sphere, one may act 
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with one’s fellows, but in doing so, realizes a power which is greatest as soon as it escapes him – 
power in concert. Moreover, Arendt argues that not only do we seek emancipation from the 
oppression and repression of the social sphere, but we also desire an emancipation from ourselves 
in that we want to project and ‘display’ the Self for the Other (Selbstdarstellung). In the end, the actor 
ultimately senses an utter feeling of incompletion, a lack of emancipation and recognition. Only by 
satisfying this lack would he finally be granted the feeling of human power, but this is only 
possible within the public space of human equality which exists necessarily vis-à-vis the Other.  
If one can only become conscious of the origin of one’s sense of ‘lack’ from within 
through the political act itself, what does Arendt have to say regarding the nature of ‘the act’? 
Within Arendt’s theory lies a fundamental tension regarding how the ‘act’ plays itself out in politics 
insofar as it leads to a sense of ‘rebirth’ and overcoming. We encounter first the political act of 
heroic, radical greatness. However, we also understand the act to be conditioned by the symbolic 
norms and customs of one’s world and aimed at expressing understanding. In his book, The 
Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves has concisely produced this very 
dualism in Arendt’s concepts of action and the public sphere:  
Different assessments of Arendt’s theory of action can be explained in terms of a 
fundamental tension in her theory between an expressive and a communicative model of 
action […] Communicative action is oriented to reaching understanding and it is 
characterized by the norms of symmetry and reciprocity between subjects who are 
recognized as equal. Expressive action, on the other hand, allows for the self-actualization 
or the self-realization of the person, and its norms are the recognition and confirmation of 
the uniqueness of the self and its capacities by others.135  
 
Expressive action, then, is concerned with the “great and memorable deeds” of a republican elite, 
whose actions are what instigate the endless narratives within politics shared between citizens. The 
political act is to ‘realize’ the Self for the collective. The second, however, follows the associative 
political model, whereby ordinary citizens enter into the political realm as equals, acquire the 
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capacity to act and judge by constituting the body politic’s plurality. However, as I see it, this 
dichotomy is indeed one of the most revealing clues to why Arendt’s understanding of the political 
act is both communicative and expressive. As Seyla Benhabib puts it, “It is not only that we are the 
subject matter of the stories of others but also that we discover who we are and come to know 
ourselves for ourselves through the words and deeds we engage in, in the company of others.”136  
For my argument, I will offer an interpretation of this tension in Arendt’s understanding of 
political action by enlisting psychoanalysis to argue that Arendt’s theory is best described in terms 
of an instersubjectively constituted narrative politics. This can be defined as the network of individual acts 
which are transformed into a single event through narration: a common social imaginary that is 
persistently evolving within the every changing and unpredictable “web of relationships and 
enacted stories.” This web is realized by persons whose identity is simultaneously for the Other as 
well as for the Self. As they realize their own autonomy, then, they must realize the Other’s, as well. 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis conceptualizes not only our sense of ‘lack’ before the 
political act is realized, but, more importantly, why our sense of enjoyment is fulfilled through 
political action, i.e. our sense of empowerment that springs from the ‘act’ itself. The desire for 
emancipation and self-recognition for and by the Other, however, may even become repressed 
into the unconscious until it is fully articulated and realized within the public sphere.137 With the 
rise of the social within politics, the depersonalizing modes of mass society threaten to eliminate 
the possibility for political action. In a 1954 lecture Arendt made clear the modern assault on 
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ability to distinguish themselves amongst a collective of equals.  
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political action: “The world’s central problems today are the political organization of mass 
societies and the political integration of technical power.”138 For Arendt, the ‘totalitarian shadow’ 
always looms over politics when the social world aims to destroy the public space of human 
equality, where men may not only emancipate themselves from their feeling of inequality and 
oppression but also where they feel at home in the presence of the Other, for whom they act and speak.  
In order to do this, I will once again argue for the linkage between the Freudian 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and Hannah Arendt. Pairing two thinkers as different in thought and 
style as Lacan and Arendt is admittedly an arduous task. Especially as we now turn to Arendt’s 
politics, which she went to great pains to argue must be distanced from the intimacy of family life, 
this would seem at first rather impossible. However, I think there is proper justification for doing 
so. First, as Dolan argues in his well-articulated piece concerning Arendt and Lacan’s analogous 
understanding of political identity, both thinkers offer non-substantialist views concerning the Self 
and its involvement with the collective.  
In particular, both Lacan’s concept of a subject of the unconscious that emerges through 
‘the disclosure of the other,’ and Arendt’s concept of the ‘disclosure of the agent in 
speech and action,’ involve a refusal of the attempt to anchor identity in a secure ground, 
nature or referent that would be immune from the finitude and and ambiguity stigmatized 
by traditional metaphysics but affirmed as ‘the only world’ by each of these thinkers.139 
 
Similarly, Lacan and Arendt refuse to sketch out a theory that promises infinitely greater equality 
and rational progress. Instead, both tend to focus on the uniqueness and individuality of actors, 
stressing universal equality in terms of ‘humanness’. Both point out the radical identity of 
difference exhibited by each actor. This identity, then, is one both constituted by the individual 
Ego, but it is also shaped by our acknowledgment of the universal Other existing in our world. For 
this reason, the identity of actors is what shapes the plurality of the outside world, because identity 
has the potential to assume a multiplicity of incalculable appearances. Third, like Lacan, Arendt 
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argues that the Other is at the heart of our formation of universal ideals and judgments. For 
Lacan’s part, the ideal ‘images’ of the Self and the world are constructed based on one’s fantasy of 
what Others would want, drawing on the collective symbols and customs one has encountered. 
Likewise, Arendt argues that our faculty to judge and act are in many ways shaped by the Other, 
whom we internalize as our thinking partner, since it is he who we must face when we leave the 
quiet confines of the private realm.  
 For Arendt and Lacan, it is only through our discourse with the Other that we can come 
to an understanding concerning the nature of our actions.  For Arendt, it is only in the presence of 
“acting men” that we may become fully aware of “that which always consciously or unconsciously 
is directly engaged in action,” and “come to terms with what irrevocably happened and be 
reconciled with what unavoidably exists.”140  Arguing that if we want to come to understand what 
underpins our everyday actions, Lacan argues that "it is only once it is formulated, named in the 
presence of the Other, that desire appears in the full sense of the term." In other words, one is not 
‘driven’ to enter into the public space and politics, neither is he driven to psychoanalysis. Both 
politics and psychoanalysis are seen as modes of discourse which “reveal” aspects of the agent that 
would otherwise remain hidden. Thus, we are not necessarily required to realize our desires 
through either the political space or psychoanalysis: indeed, we may always consciously elect to 
repress whatever desire we may have to emancipate ourselves from oppression or the desire to be 
recognized within the world. For Arendt, the public space is woven by the fragile human artifice 
of human relationships and communication, which suggests that politics is always in jeopardy of 
collapsing since the tides of society may bring about its very capitulation.  If we are to understand 
Arendt correctly, then, we must say that when one speaks and acts in the public realm, he is 
articulating a fundamental desire, Lacan’s désir and Freud’s Wunsch, to have himself heard and have 
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himself seen after being silenced within the private sphere and oppressed within the social sphere. 
This is on par with Lacan’s interpretation of psychoanalysis which he sees as the only place of 
discourse which can ‘bring desire into existence’ the realization that all “Man’s desire is the desire of 
the Other,”141 the political space, for Arendt, is where man comes to terms with the fundamental 
lack from within, a lack of Other – he wants only to be recognized by the Other. But finally, Lacan 
argues that since we desire recognition, “The object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object 
desired by someone else.”142 Similarly, for Arendt, what we desire (the content) is what we think 
the autonomous Other also desires – the political right to be seen and heard within the collective 
Otherness.  
If we are to argue for the re-interpretation of Arendt’s political theory in light of the above 
psychoanalytic reading, we must recognize that ‘desire’ in its true sense is, however, rooted in 
fantasy and imagination, and that the intervention of reason is simultaneously the critique of 
fantasy. Thus, if our desire for emancipation and recognition is to be satisfied within the political 
realm by acting and speaking in the presence of the Other, in what way does reason interact with 
desire in order to motivate our will to act politically?  We must concede that, Arendt’s 
understanding of desire itself is rather antiquated. Taking her cue from the ancient Greeks, she 
argues that desire is can never be a part of the “free political act,” in which case “we could have 
always left undone what we actually did – something not at all true of mere desire or of the 
appetites […] or the sheer force of wanting something close at hand may override any 
considerations of either Will or Reason.”143 However, in response, I argue that this view fails 
because, while a free act most certainly must be informed by reason, what behaves as the ‘basic 
sparkplug’ of action, which is often hidden from conscious observation, is the element of desire I 
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have described. Indeed, the problems of private desires and how people fulfill their desires in 
social contexts bleed into the arena of politics and collective action. Desires cannot completely be 
quieted in our discourse with others, but, indeed, it is through politically directed action and 
speech that we may come to terms with (make conscious) what we desire the most (the Other) and 
simultaneously our own underlying human identity, which is shaped by both the collective and our 
Self.144 In order to map out the content and ramifications of political desire, it is necessary to find 
in Arendt first a theory of imagination and a theory of intersubjectivity, and demonstrate how these 
faculties are irreducibly connected with human desire. Whereas Arendt has linked imagination and 
intersubjectivity to human reason, I will show that what she fails to recognize even in her own 
writing is the implicit desire for the Other in politics, the desire to be recognized by the Other in 
reciprocal discourse.   
First, Arendt’s theory of imagination can be found in her lectures concerning Kant’s 
aesthetic philosophy. She differs herself from thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas in claiming that 
political judgment is not purely cognitive (i.e. judgments are valid due to the fact that we have 
preconditions for such). Rather, for Arendt, imagination exists in virtue of its proclivity towards 
‘free-play’, which “considered in its freedom -- nothing compels us to consider it as such -- is not 
bound to the law of causality, but is productive and spontaneous, not merely reproductive of what 
                                               
144 I would further argue that this approach 1.) remains faithful to Arendt’s original intention in her studies of the 
mind, “If there is anything in thinking that can prevent men from doing evil, it must be some property inherent in the 
activity itself, regardless of its objects” (Life of the Mind, ‘Thinking’, p. 180). For Arendt, if one wants to understand 
what it means to think, this requires understanding that all thought is shaped (both consciously and unconsciously, or 
as she prefers, skirting the psychoanalytically inflected terminology, “unconsciously conscious”) by the difference that 
is inserted within me through Otherness, which necessarily exists in and outside me. However, I argue 2.) that this 
approach goes further in understanding the linkage between thinking and committing evil acts. As Lacan contends in 
his essay, “Kant with Sade,” there may well be a link between the sublime, disinterested a priori theory of judgment 
produced by Kant and the unrestrained, pleasurable violence of evil. As I see it, we cannot limit ourselves to the realm 
of pure thought when we address politics. There is not sufficient justification for why desire should not be added to 
our overall calculus of political action. We must come to terms with the fact that ‘desire’ necessarily plays a crucial role 
in human thinking and willing. It is only if we are conscious of the many ways in which desire may affect our actions 
(both politically and when politics has crumbled) that we may be able to harness desire and its effects, always 
remaining cognizant of our inevitable encounter with the Other, who exists both within and without us.  
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is already known, but generative of new forms and figures.”145 Arendt’s notion of imagination is 
deeply informed by her own experience with totalitarianism, which appeared as a radically new 
concept and seemed to shatter all other notions of political understanding. She thus considers it 
important to leave room in any understanding of imagination for the unpredictable, non-
experienced and non-imagined concepts of mind.  
Arendt argues that our faculty of imagination fundamentally grounds our sense of 
judgment. Modeling her argument closely after Kant’s aesthetic theory of judgment, Arendt argues 
that political judgment is open to the same “free-play” as the imagination, thus not limiting it to 
pre-established laws or categories. When we judge, we judge as spectators within a much larger 
community, the sensus communis, as distinguished from sensus privatus.146 The sensus communis for both 
Arendt and Kant are important, because it is what governs the sphere of human speech and action. 
This presupposes that in virtue of the sensus communis the symbolic world of language exists 
between men. When we express our own ‘taste’, which is “this ‘community sense’ (gemeinschaftlicher 
Sinn), and sense means here ‘the effect of a reflection upon the mind,’”147 to the rest of the world, 
our imaginative reflection is formatted ‘not only for me but also for the Other.’ Arendt argues that 
while the ‘it-pleases-or-displeases-me’ seems to only concern the private ‘taste’ of the individual 
ego alone, it “is actually rooted in this community sense and is therefore open to communication 
once it has been transformed by reflection, which takes all others and their feelings into 
account.”148  
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Thus, when we judge something as beautiful, following Kant, our pleasure arises from the 
fact that our taste is sociable (the feeling of approbation).  In our aesthetic judgment of the beautiful 
and our political judgment of politics the pleasure derived from judging does not spring from 
personal satisfaction, but rather because judgment itself ‘permits’ us a feeling of pleasure. That is 
to say, by actively defining a new representation from the particular, we are pleased by our ‘duty’ to 
‘represent’ the sensus communis in our judgment. In a lecture entitled “Some Questions of Moral 
Philosophy,” Arendt reflects on the sense in which our political imagination involves a “speaking 
through the Other”: 
The more people’s positions I can make present in my thought and hence take into 
account in my judgment, the more representative [my judgment] will be. The validity of 
such judgments would be neither objective and universal nor subjective, depending on 
personal whim, but intersubjective and representative. This kind of representative thought, 
which is possible only through imagination, demands certain sacrifices; Kant says, ‘we 
must so to speak renounce ourselves for the sake of other …’ [We] are considerate in the original 
sense of the word, we consider the existence of others and we must try to win their 
agreement.’149  
 
What is interesting about Arendt understanding of imagination and judgment is that it 
closely resembles Freud’s concept of the reality principal. For Freud and Arendt, the ‘mature’ 
individual150, seeks pleasure, but is no longer “governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the 
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reality principle, which also, at bottom, seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through 
taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and diminished.”151  Arendt argues that 
“taking account of reality” means looking towards the ‘realm of approbation’ within the world.  In 
other words, our pleasure now stems from the universal communicability of our judgment. In the end, 
while Arendt herself never did express it, her sense of the political imaginary indeed implies the 
desire for recognition by the Other in politics. That is to say, if sociability is necessarily part and 
parcel to our understanding of judgment and individuality, there must consequently exist a 
subjective desire for the Other and his recognition in the Umwelt within our political imagination. 
However, in order to identify properly this implication for Arendt’s political theory, I 
propose that a critique of Arendt and Kant’s understanding of imagination and judgment can 
actually reveal that, first, desire is an irreducible element to the political imaginary and, second, that 
desire is not a “pathological” element of our thinking.  As Žižek and Lacan have pointed out, 
there is in Kant’s aesthetic theory a “duty to judge,” which seems to share the same ‘pleasure’ as 
sadism.   By “pronouncing the judgment that defines our duty,” by judging the particular in order 
to assign it to a certain universal maxim, we “‘elevate an object to the dignity of the Thing’ 
(Lacan’s definition of sublimation).” In other words, the fundamental critique of Arendt’s theory 
of political judgment is rooted in the idea that in saying it is one’s ‘duty’ to judge as a disinterested 
spectator and without the interference of personal desire or pleasure, inventing the universal-obligatory 
dimension, one paradoxically encounters the  
perverse attitude of adopting the position of the pure instrument of the big Other’s Will: 
it’s not my responsibility, it’s not me who is effectively doing it, I am merely an instrument 
of the higher Historical Necessity…The obscene jouissance of this situation is generated by 
the fact that I conceive of myself as exculpated for what I am doing: isnt’t it nice to be able 
to inflict pain on others with the full awareness that I’m not responsible for it, that I 
merely fulfill the Other’s Will.152 
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In other words, by arguing for the repression of “pathological” desires in our judgment, Arendt 
and Kant fail to recognize the possibility for a loss of responsibility in political imagination and 
judgment: the Kantian subject says to himself, “It is my duty to judge this object, and I am only 
speaking through the Other’s will in my own particular judgment.” The subject subverts the fact 
that present within his own political imagination is the “non-pathological” desire of the Other, which 
would mean that one is not speaking through the Other as his imagination actually ‘desires’ what the 
Other desires.  He must acknowledge, therefore, that he is fully responsible for translating the particulars and 
forming a judgment that not only the Other wants, but that he wants as well. For Lacan’s part, there is a way 
around this, which would conceivably leave Arendt’s otherwise remarkably well-thought out 
theory of judgment intact.  
In short, Lacan asserts the necessity of a ‘critique of pure desire’: in contrast to Kant, for 
whom our capacity to desire is thoroughly ‘pathological’ (since, as he repeatedly stresses, 
there is no a priori link between an empirical object and the pleasure this object generates 
in the subject), Lacan claims that there is a ‘pure faculty of desire,’ since desire does have a 
non-pathological, a priori object-cause – this object, of course, is what Lacan calls objet 
petit a.153  
 
In a word, this would involve recognizing that our faculty of desire is, like our faculty of reason, 
“pure” in that action is always governed by the a priori ‘little object’ of the imaginary order. Consider, 
for example, the voyeur who sits behind a curtain and fantasizes about the figure on the other side. 
As soon as the screen is lifted, he may well discover the reality of his desire, that the figure was a 
actually a ‘hairy man’. However, the ‘reality’ is that the voyeur does actually desire the Real thing 
framed by the veil, the Thing, which actually is the Other. While we may tell ourselves that what 
we want is X (the fantasy), what underscores and motivates our desire is the real Other: what we 
desire is really the desire of the Other. The objet petit a, is produced from the original relationship 
with the Other in order to compensate for the Real of the situation – for the “symbolic castration” 
(i.e. it is really a hairy man). 
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Now to apply this example to Kant and Arendt’s conception of judgment, by extracting 
from the particular object a universal claim, what is ‘contingent’ is the content of the judgment, i.e. 
‘the fantasy’. We become unaware of the fact that we have elevated the object to a sublime, 
fantastical object, which in turn supplies us with jouissance. It is not that desire is “pathological.” 
On the contrary, even in our judgments, we cannot resist but to escape the ‘lack within the Other’ 
(the Real of the Other) so that we may ‘enjoy’ our fantasy. We must recognize that what 
undergirds our political imagination and faculty of judgment is always the desire for the Other, for 
his recognition. Lacan has shown us how the objet petit a of a particular group (e.g. the Jews) indeed 
can play a decisive role in politics and ideology. If we fail to realize that the use of objets petit a is to 
‘fill the gap’ in politics, of some particular loss, with the aim of repressing it and controlling it, 
politics may very well lose its ‘unpredictable’ nature. While Lacan argues that the objet petit a is only 
apprehensible through psychoanalysis, this object may be exposed just as well through the 
discourse within politics. By submitting our judgments to the infinite plurality which constitutes 
the space of equality known as the body politic, no one judgment remains superior to the other. 
Indeed, the underlying fantasies regarding the Other can only be exposed within the infinite 
critical discourse between dissimilar persons in politics. As Samuel Weber comments concerning 
Kant’s reflective judgment, we cannot ignore our projection of the knowledge we desire into the 
object at hand. Indeed, our projects are never made entirely innocently. Weber proposes that 
“Perhaps what we should try to think about are ways not so much of escaping from it, as of 
putting it into play; in this case, however, it might just be criticism that turns out to have a leading 
part.154    
As a final point, I would like to show how Arendt’s thesis in The Life of the Mind – that the 
subject is split between immediate self-certainty and its representation in language and discourse 
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with ‘the Other’ – reveals Arendt’s realization that the Self’s identity exists both personally as well 
as for the Other. Namely, in order to appear in the public space of plurality we must decenter 
primary narcissism and realize the “two-in-one,” that we are all radically dependent creatures. 
Consider the following justification from Arendt concerning the nature of the ‘thinking dialogue’ 
which exists within the Self,  
difference and otherness, which are such outstanding characteristics of the world of 
appearances as it is given to man for his habitat among a plurality of things, are the very 
conditions for the existence of man’s mental ego as well, for this ego actually exists only in 
duality. And this ego—the I-am-I—experiences difference in identity precisely when it is 
not related to the things that appear but only related to itself.155  
 
That is to say, Arendt argues that we must consider simultaneously the ways in which both the 
Other and the Ego are intimately intertwined within the Self insofar as they both constitute a 
distinct aspect of our conscious deliberations. Through public discourse we internalize the 
multiplicity of opinion and will that constitutes the collective Other in politics. However, when we 
return to the quietness of contemplation, the only one to keep us company is the internal 
conversation between myself and “the viewpoint of the Other.” Arendt follows Kant’s contention 
that thinking is undeniably tied to communication with the Other: “we think, as it were, in 
community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts as they communicate theirs to 
us.”156 Similarly for Lacan, conscious thought is intimately bound with the desire of the Other 
through an unconscious discourse between me and the Other. This most certainly seems to carry 
significant political weight.  Let us consider Lacan’s following justification for why man not only 
desires to be recognized, but in his discourse unconsciously articulates the desire of the Other.  
If desire in the subject must pass through the defiles of the signifier […] it must be posited 
that man’s desire is the desire of the Other.157  
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This what I mean by my formula that the unconscious is the discours de l’Autre (discourse of 
the Other), in which the de is to be understood in the sense of the Latin de (objective 
determination): de alio in oration (completed by: tua res agitur).  
     But we must also add that man’s desire is desir de l’Autre (desire of the Other), in which 
the de provides what grammarians call the ‘subjective determination’, namely that it is qua 
Other that he desires (the true significance of human passion).158 
 
The upshot of Lacan’s argument here is that, the discourse with the Other is internally contained 
within the unconscious – it is inseparable from our psychic processing. But most importantly, in 
our conversation with the Other, we desire most what the Other lacks, since “desire is an effect in the 
subject of the condition that is imposed on him by the existence of discourse.”159  Politically 
speaking this means desiring emancipation and freedom. Much like Plato and Socrates, Arendt’s 
fear concerning desire was that it never did take into consideration a universal concern for the 
Other, but was singly bound to the egoistic pleasures of the body. However, through Lacan’s 
insightful analysis of the Self, we can clearly see that the Other is part and parcel to the content of 
our own desires (whether we consciously know it or not!). This approach allows us to finally see 
that desire, in Lacan’s account, follows unpredictable and unforeseeable directions – just as Arendt 
argues that human action is “unbounded” and unpredictable. However, desire is anything but 
egoistic. It is a perpetual quest for knowledge by taking into account the already constituted field 
of viewpoints within the collective, a “constant Becoming” that can only thrive within the political 
space of emancipation and mutual recognition.  
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Conclusion: 
 
It would be a mistake to read Hannah Arendt from the perspective of pure political 
philosophy or political science. For her part, she rejected this title on the grounds that philosophy 
tended to focus on the single man instead of his relationship within the collective. She writes in 
The Human Condition that her thought falls best under the broad umbrella of political theory for this 
very reason that "men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”160 When one reads 
Arendt’s writing, one quickly realizes the rich fabric of interpretative approaches and analytical 
mechanisms employed by Arendt. As with any great author, his or her ability to be applied to a 
variety of situations and to stand up to the test of never-ending criticism is one of the greatest 
markers of intellectual brilliance.   
This thesis has in many ways departed from the mainstream literature concerning Arendt’s 
politics, and has instead aligned itself most closely with the works of Julia Kristeva, who has been 
the first to provide us with a psychoanalytic reading of Arendt’s own life as a woman as well as of 
her understanding of identity and politics. In arguing for a rapprochement of Arendt’s thought 
with psychoanalysis, it has been necessary to demonstrate not only that Arendt was fully immersed 
in the psychoanalytic theories circulating through her friend circles in The Frankfurt School, but 
also, what is most surprising, remained silent to the fact that her understanding of discourse and 
hermeneutic in politics as a form of “narrative” actually reminds one of the never-ceasing 
interpretation within Freud’s unconscious. Much like the narrative that takes place between analyst 
and analysand, the story that springs from the political space is not meant to uncover an “original 
truth” concerning politics, as many philosophers have notoriously done throughout Western 
history. Rather, the point is to articulate in speech the “repressed” moments of trauma and action 
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which have ultimately constructed the present situation. In this way, Arendt along with Freud see 
that the process of narration is never immune to the inevitable interpretative process, all of which 
reveals a “lost” phenomenological substratum.  The role of politics as well as the relationship 
between the analyst and analysand is to bring one to the point of gladness and comfort in 
exposing those hidden moments that shape subjectivity, and to rejoice in one’s ability to overcome 
the very oppressive forces which have acted as a bulwark to his own freedom.  
By presenting Arendt in this light, it has been possible to ask Arendt difficult questions 
concerning the implications for the “loss of the public space” and the concomitant decline in 
political intersubjectivity, recognition and freedom.  The central thread that runs throughout this 
thesis has been, acknowledging Arendt’s own parallels with psychoanalytic theory, in what ways 
can we construct a reading that takes into account the tremendous importance of desire, which so 
demonstrably is part of our political decisions and motivations? First, I have attempted to show 
that as Arendt describes the gradual retraction of the public space of politics in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, much as Jürgen Habermas did in The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, she points to a certain melancholia, or the inability to mourn the loss of political 
emancipation and recognition, understood in Arendtian terms. Concomitantly, the subject was 
isolated from the common world of intersubjective relations which would have granted meaning 
to political action; instead, he was left to the dark confines of whatever private social sphere to 
which life’s game of luck may have assigned him. The inability to act, to be seen and heard in 
public, was an essential factor in the subject’s open sympathy towards totalitarianism.  
We also saw how Arendt employed the figure of ‘the Jew’ as a figure of difference. In this 
case, she even describes how the Jew gradually became a target for transference and projection of 
all of the failures and “losses” the melancholic subject had endured until then. In other words, in 
order to escape the brutal assault on the ego, instead of accepting the “loss” and opening himself 
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up to reconstruction with the Other through mutual discourse, the subject retreated into the world 
of objectivity, seen as the racist nationalist ideology which solidified latent ideas concerning the 
Jew into a concrete reality.  
As Freud articulated in Mourning and Melancholia, “The most remarkable characteristic of 
melancholia, and the one in most need of explanation, is its tendency to change round into mania.”161  
What had behaved as the primer for the acceptance of totalitarianism had been the sense of 
political isolation brought on by melancholia; however, what Arendt saw as the object which was 
secretly provoking the “genocidal mentality” was the desire for the Jew as a figure of difference, as 
the solution to the sense of failure and “loss” in politics.  Moreover, the sense of “mania,” or the 
immense proclivity towards radical action, was fueled by a fundamental sense of desire which has 
arisen within the nation-state starting when capitalist imperialism initially entered the scene of 
politics. For Arendt, the fact was that the desire for surplus value created the desire for surplus 
men. I have shown in this thesis how this latent desire functioned as the new unobtainable object, 
Lacan’s objet petit a. Thus, whereas the “figure of the Jew” was the outward manifestation of desire, 
what undergirded the psychic terrain of the subject in totalitarianism was a basic desire for surplus 
enjoyment, which expressed itself in the following formula: “Surrender yourself to the command 
of ideology! Do it not for yourself or for the sake of humanity but for the sake of the command 
itself!” Recall that surplus enjoyment in capitalism arises from the “giving up” of pleasure for a 
moment in order to exceed the pleasure principle in search for the surplus: the enjoyment is in the 
“never-ending” superfluous excess which persists to drive the subject’s desire for “more.” 
Likewise, imperialism developed through the understanding that entire groups of men, seen as 
commodified objects, are superfluous in the face of nationalist ideology. Here the command was 
the same: “Forget about your own actions in relation to other men. What matters is that you 
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surrender yourself to the “tribal consciousness” of the nation!” Arendt wagered that when politics 
became the handmaiden of imperialist ideology, the notion of “superfluous men” was elevated to 
the level of a national object, and became synonymous with the already entrenched idea of 
capitalism of “superfluous capital.” Ultimately, it was the failure of bourgeois capitalism, which 
had hitherto dominated the privatized game of politics, that led the subject to deny ‘surplus capital’ 
in return for “surplus people.” Totalitarianism brought together in a crystallized form the forces 
which had been latent in European politics and culture since the latter half of the nineteenth 
century: Because the subject was unable to mourn the loss of politics, his feeling of individual 
failure and disappointment could be transferred to ‘the Jew’, only this time, this object of 
transference was elevated to the national level in a reified form of that which had always 
undergirded imperialism all along – the command to enjoy “surplus people.”  
In the final section of this thesis, I have extended my analysis to Arendt’s overall 
conceptualization of politics. Arendt’s ‘fragile’ public space of politics is rooted in the fundamental 
desire for emancipation and recognition from the Other, something which exists 
phenomenologically within the unconscious. In other words, following the destruction of the 
public space under totalitarianism, Arendt saw that it was necessary to “return” not only those 
“lost” moments of trauma which had precipitated Nazism and Stalinism, but also those precious 
moments of human action and togetherness in public politics. This was never to imply a certain 
“answer” to how politics should function. Rather, Arendt sought to return the subject to that 
“never-ceasing conversation” that goes on in politics between men, whereby endless criticism and 
debate propels the “political narration” that binds the Self to the Other in the collective.  
Arendt indeed approached, albeit not explicitly, but unconsciously, the question of desire 
for emancipation in politics, the space where my ‘desire for the Other’ can be most (but never 
completely) satisfied. This solves the question we had for Arendt’s political constellation: why is 
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the subject propelled to enter into the public space of politics? For her part, Arendt may have 
sought to avoid the “naturalistic fallacy” employed by Hobbes and Locke, which posited that men 
“should” enter politics based on a posited conception of the natural state of human beings. Since 
she expressed such great disdain for those philosophers and psychologists who subsumed the 
entirety of the human condition under a particular “metaphysics,” she argued that there was no 
“original position” for either man or politics. Rather, what we are left with is Arendt’s concepts of 
imagination and intersubjectivity, both of which are fundamentally informed by the “free play” 
with the Other in discourse, both within and without the Self.  Prior to one’s entrance into politics, 
one feels a tremendous “lack” in the sense that my conversation with the Other in intersubjective 
thinking and imagination must be externalized, and that the internal dialogue which occurs from 
within must be informed by the symbolic discourse with the Other outside the Self. The point, 
therefore, contra Arendt’s initial contention, is that desire is not an undirected pathological egoism but 
rather is informed by and directed towards the Other’s desire.  It is an inescapable aspect of the 
human condition that cannot be simply suppressed by the strong hand of reason. On the contrary, 
there is justification to believe that both reason and desire operate on different levels but 
dichotomously in our judgments and political actions.  If we recall Plato’s Phaedrus, where the soul 
is guided by two horses – the black horse of desire and the white horse of reason – the point is 
that we should not do away with passion and desire which in many cases drives us towards a 
particular object, but rather should be tamed by reason so that we may have the “right desires.” 
However, this is still not quite the case as I have suggested above. Desire itself is already directed 
‘towards’ the Other’s desire (a direct reflection of symbolic discourse); reason then is not seen as a 
“horse tamer” since the “content” of desire may fluctuate and change without permission from 
reason. That is to say, we may be entirely unaware of what actually is behind and compels our 
motivations and actions (as was the case in totalitarianism)! Rather, it is by submitting our 
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judgments (which necessarily consider ‘representatively’ the Other within the sensus communis, since 
the Self is composed of Other and Ego) to the criticism within the collective plurality of politics 
that I may realize the ‘content’ of my desire and, consequently, come to know myself. The political 
space of discourse, much like the conversation between analyst and analysand, provides us with a 
sense of ‘overcoming’ to the extent that we are able to ‘work through’ the hidden contents of our 
speech and action. Ultimately, it is by speaking and acting in politics that we can come to terms 
with “an uncovered past” and the forgotten moments in our history which compel our desires and 
actions.  
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